Page 237 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

THE LUFTW AFFE IN THE MEDITERR.ANEAN 223

In his Directive No. 38 of 2 December 1941 Hitler had expressed his wish
that the centrai Mediterranean should become the "center of efforcs·· of the axis
powers. Considering the fact that Britain experienced almost 50 per cene of her ,
naval losses in the Mediterranean mainly through air action, this became largely
true as long as che land-based Luftwaffe could operate from nearby airfields, could
assist che army to hold its ground, and as long as the fighters could secure regional
air superiority and protect the bombers and torpedo planes attacking British sip-
ping. Stili in the first five months of 1943 the Luftwaffe sank 30 ships with 196 000
GRT plus two destroyers, four submarines and one escort vessel, and it damaged
108 ships with 498 000 GRT plus two cruisers, six destroyers, three submarines
and two patrol boats. Even as late as in che fall of that year it inflicted a serious
blow on the British fleet in the batde for the Aegean Islands, because the absence
of sufficient British air cover allowed full exploitation of German air superiority
in the area. So the deception plan "Mincemeat"' of the British, though successfully
diverting German defensive preparations against an Allied landing from Sicily to
the Balkans, cose them dearly after ali (Annex V). The British lost about 115 against
45 German aircraft and a steep drop in serviceability numbers, and furthermore
one cruiser and six descroyers, while three cruisers and 4 destroyers were damaged.
However, with their air superiority gone, the German air units could no longer
fulfil their missions later on and che Mediterranean became again a safe shipping
route for the Allies.
But let us return to Malta in the summer of 1942. The favourable conditions
achieved by the axis powers at that time coult ha ve been maintained only by sustai-
ned bombing attacks on Malta or by a successfullanding on che island. The latter
was in preparation, since it was known that large parts of 2 Air Fleet had co be
diverted to the imminent summer campaign in southern Russia, which aimed at
the oil wells at Baku and the British position in the Middle East. In view of Rom-
mels quick advance to the N ile Delta Hitler believed, however, that Malta would
this way be rendered harmless and did not need to be taken. The best time for
a landing on the island would ha ve been in May or June shortly after the Luftwaffe
had gained air supremacy there in Aprii. Bue Kesselring would only be ready for
this operation by 18 July, when air superiority had already been lost despite 2 Air
Fleefs attempt to re-establish it in early July. Another such attempt failed in Octo-
ber. The Luftwaffe ha d cri ed to win che air battle in the centrai Mediterranea n with
the same - though improved - twin-engine bombers and single-engine fighters em-
ployed two years before in the Batde of Britain and lost i t against the same British
aircraft for same reasons: lack of range of bombers and fighters and insufficient
numbers, enabling the British to reinforce their fighters in Malta by means of air-
craft carriers and also to step up their bomber forces there and to re-establish che
naval base. The Luftwaffe's successes against the British Malta-convoys ''Harpoon··
and "Vigorous·· in June and "Pedescal"' in August 1942 could not prevent final
defeat and loss of contro! of che sea supply lanes (Annex VI). In conseqyence an