Page 236 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

222 HORST BOOG

However, in the second half of 1941 plans failed no t only in Russia but also
in the Mediterranean. The British were able to quench the Iraqi uprising, which
the Luftwaffe cried co support with very weak forces, and to occupy Syria and the
Lebanon inJune andJuly. The transfer ofX Air Fleet turned out to be a blunder,
because the ltalian Air Force, which had warned against it, could not hold down
Malta as a nava~ and air base. The Luftwaffe had not considered the possibility
of remaining in Sicily and controlling the eastern Mediterranean via che bases in
Greece - probably because this would bave overscretched its limited formations.
In addition Crete had been considered more importane than Malta because of the
former's closer proximity to the Rumanian oil and the shipping lane through the
Isthmus of Corinth, and the heavy German airborne losses and casualties had ma-
de Hitler hesitant about another try in Malta. So the battle for the sea communica-
tions especially in the centrai part of the Mediterranean was lost again to the
recovering British. In conseguence Rommel's forces in North Africa could not be
supplied and reinforced at the same pace as the British forces in Egypt. Neither
Air Leader Africa nor X Air Corps raids on the Suez Canal could prevent this.
The canal could not be closed by mining, oil refineries there could not be destroyed,
British supply shipping not be reduced sufficiently, the RAF and submarines in
Malta could no t be eliminated an d the Alexandria fleet not be drive n out forever,
while, on the other hand, the axis lost more and more supply ships en route to
Libya. Although the necessity to send new flying units to Sicily soon became ob-
vious, the Luftwaffe hesitated because its main forces were tied down in Russia.
As ofOccober 1941 X Air Corps had to cease attacks on the Nile-Delta and devote
its main efforts to the protection of the supply convoys from ltaly via the Greek
west coast to Benghasis. This was not the proper employment for bombers, but
there were no adequate long-range escort fighters. Reinforcements carne too late
to prevent Rommel's defeat by Auchinleck in the Marmarica and the loss of the
Cyrenaica in che winter of 194111942.
Contrary co his former beliefs Hitler now thoughc for a moment thac the sou-
thern theater of war was no longer a side-show but che ''decisive regio n'' for a suc-
cessful continuation of the war. Besides the deployment of German submarines and
motor torpedo boats in the Mediterranean also the staff of 2 Air Flee~ commanded
by Field Marshal Kesselring, in personal union also Supreme German Commander
South, and the entire Ilnd Air Corps were transferred to ltaly and Sicily from Rus-
sia, where they were also badly needed for the thrust o n Moscow. l t was hoped
chat this reinf~rcement would give the war in the Mediterranean a favourable turn.
In fact, Malta was bombed· to the brink of elimination as an air and naval base
in the spring of 1942 and most of the axis supply convoys reached their destina-
tions in Libya agin unhampered. Rommel was thus able co reconquer the Cyrenai-
ca already early in February. By the middle of July he stood at El Alamein just
a hundred kilometers west of Alexandria, and Tobruk had been captured this time
(Annex N).