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RISING SUN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 49

suffering from German submarines. We cannot ignore this situation by any means.
It is our duty to save the Allies. If we let them die without our making any attempt
to save our Allies, we will lose not only our interests which we have gained, but
will also suffer the great pain of defeat. We cannot just sit back and watch this
situation. We have therefore decided to despatch the squadron under your command.
"I cannot give you a large number of ships now as the Navy is short of suitable
destroyers, but I hope you will do your best to show the honour, and to expand
the influence of our country". But, Prime Minister Terauchi's explanation was one
sided and only a surface reason. There were complex reasons why Japan accepted
despatching naval forces to Europe arid why the Japanese Navy had been reluctant
to do so.
It was due to the international situation, especially the fenseJapanese-American
relations, which impelled Japan to prepare for .American agressive policy toward
Japan. American public opinion gradualy worsened after the Russo-Japanese War.
During the years, before America entered the war, anti-Japanese feelings became
highly antagonistic as a result of German propaganda which aimed to separate and
cut the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Germans alos turned American opinion to
become anti-British using the concept o.f raicial prejudice of the "Yellow Peril".
Captain Edward H. Rymer, British Naval attache, explained this relation as Japan
being really "a nut between British and American crackers" in his report<60)_ This
Japanese uneasiness, however, was not understood by Britain and the Allies. So
there arose very strong criticism and suspicon among Allies. The First Sea Lord,
Vice Admiral Sir Henry B. Jackson, wrote in 1916 that Japan's attitude gave rise
to some suspicion as to its action after the war when Britain might be exausted
by its efforts < >.
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Also, the British Naval Attache, Capt. Edward H. Rymer criticized in his re-
port that; "The Japanese people, the vast majority of whom have always looked
upon the war as one between European nations, with useful local pickings, ... the
Japanese do not know the meaning of gratitude, nor have they any intention of
making any considerable self sacrifice for any other nation ... It may be truly said
that Japan is drunk with money and dazed with dreams of the leadership of the
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Pacific" < l. British General Staff also distributed similar memorandum among the
Government authorities that; "Alliance is not free from attraction to the Japanese,
who are aware that their aspiration to make themselves masters of the Pacific must
be opposed by Great Britain as well as by the United States". "It is abandantly
proved that the Japanese Government meant to avoid at all costs anything but a
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symbolic participation in hostilities" < 3>.
These exaggerations which blamed Japan for selfish pursuit of her own natio-
nal interests, were one of the reason why despatch vessels were applied in the Me-
diterranean. After Japan obtained Tsing Tao and the German owned Pacific Islands,
she was satisfied to wait the fruits of war, only supplying Russia with weapons and
amunitions and obtaining Russian gold. Moreover, Japan gained profit by expor-·