Page 58 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

44 YOCHI HIRAMA

tions which prevented Japanese medical doctors from practising in the British
28
colonies < >.
In addition, on the following day, Foreign Minister Ishii wired a firm instruc-
tion to the Japanese Ambassador in London that he should convey to the British
Government that the agreement to provide the naval assistance requested would
2
not be passed in the Diet unless Britain accepted Minister Ishii·s proposal < 9>. Ne-
gotiations were continued on the 21st February, 17th and 23rd March. In view
of Grey· s efforts, lshii finally instructed Inoue on the 26th March to inform Grey
that the Japanese Government was prepared to comply with Britain's request <30>.
On 30th March, the Japanese Navy ordered two cruisers (Tushima and Tone) and
four destroyers to patrol in the Indian Ocean and the Maracca Strait and Java
Sea <30.

Request for the Mediterranean

There was no further request for Mediterranean aid until December 1916.
But after the Battle of Jutland, German naval efforts concentrated more and more
on submarine warfare. From this change of German naval operation by Decem-
.ber, Allied ships were being lost at the rate of 300 000 tons per month. Due to
this serious situation, the British Admiralty submitted a request to Japan to send
two light cruisers from the Sixth Squadron stationed at Singapore, to the Cape of
2
Hope and flotillas of destroyers to the Mediterranean <3 >. Upon receiving this re-
quest from the Admiralty, Grey instructed Greene to sound out the Japanese Go-
vernment. Greene visited the Foreign Minister Motono lchiro on 11th and Minister
of the Navy, Admiral Kato Tomosaburo on 15th January 1917, and he inquired
if Japan could despatch cruisers to the Cape of Hope and destroyers to the Medi-
terranean. To this request, opinions in the Imperial Navy were divided. One was
in favour of positive policy, asserted by Rear Admiral Akiyama Saneyuki, who had
recently returned to japan from his trip in Europe. He emphasized the importance
of cooperation and he insisted that Japan must accept British request. If Japan could
contribute more to the Allies, Japan could get a position among the Allies after
peace had been restored. He also added that Japan could gain new anti-submarine
tactics and weapons. Another opinion supported a negative policy, asserted by Com-
mander Nakamura Ryuzo, Chief of the First Section (Operation) of the Naval
General Staff. He submitted to Rear Admiral Abo Kiyotane, Chief of the First
Department of the Naval General Staff, his opinion that 'Japan must not send main
battle ships unless Japan itself were in danger, even if we were able to gain tactical
and technical gains <33>. While in Japan, a new cabinet was formed by General Te-
rauchi Masatake whose members favoured cooperation with Allies with the expec-
tation of a voice at the peace conference. Finally, the Imperial Navy decided to
despatch destroyer squadron to the Mediterranean and presented the proposed
following condition, to Ambassador Greene from Minister Motono on 2nd Fe-
4
bruary <3 >: