Page 56 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

42 YOCHI HIRAMA

Minister Yashiro relayed his negative opinion to the Foreign Minister that if main
forces were despatched to the European waters, the Navy could not secure national
defence against .. the second enemy (the United State Navyr'. Secondly Japan would
lose diplomatic power if she lost her main battleships. Thirdly, the Navy Minister
was concerned about the enormous costs for overseas campaign. Chief of the Na-
val General Staff, Vice Admiral Shimamura Hayao ·shared the opinion that Japan
should avoid the risk oflosing naval power for home defence against possible Uni-
ted States threat, and moreover that the British request was not covered by the
Treaty os>. While the Japanese Navy was debating,_ Churchill sent the following pro-
posal on 15th November to the Japanese Navy Minister Shimamura that; firstly,
Japanese Navy can make whatever dispositions of their squadrons and ships in
the Australian waters, since the British Navy will allow their own squadron to be
concentrated in the search for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and to pursue them.
Secondly, such dispositions of Japanese naval vessels in the Australian archepelago
will prevent the return to the Pacific of the German Squadron from the coast of
Chile, and also afford protection to the trade of Japan and Great Britain throu-
ghout the Indian and Pacific Oceans; thirdly, as these operations will not fully oc-
cupy the naval forces of Japan, we ask whether the Japanese Governm.ent and
Admiralty would find it agreeable to send a squadron to the Dardanelles to blocka-
de the German-Turkish fleet there. If any vessels employed in the lastnamed opera-
tion, we should of course be willing to indemmify the Japanese Government, and
all facilities for fuel, supplies and docking will be afforded by us free of cost to
any vessels employed in European waters 09).
On 18th November, the Japanese Navy replied to the British Naval Attache,
Captain Edward H. Rymer, that the first and second requests were approved and
that details would be decided by both admiralties. But with regard to the third,
it should be considered not by the naval authorities, but by the Government. The
definite answer would be given later by the Imperial Government after considera-
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tions < 0>. Then on the 25th November, Foreign Minister Kato officially declined
Britain's third request through a Memorandum. He repeated in the Memorandum
that, "the Imperial Navy is, as the British Ambassador is well aware, organized
with the main object of defending the Empire against foreign invasion and of secu-
ring Japan's position in East Asia. The despatch of a force strong enough to render
the effective assistance as desidered by British Admiralty would seriously weaken
the national defence" ... Moreover, the presence of the Japanese main fleet in these
waters being a strong factor of guarantee of peace in East Asia, its removal to the
theatre of War in Europe would render it exceedingly difficult to meet with any
emergency that may arise in East Asia, and to carry out completely the obligations
imposed upon us by the articles of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In view of these
considerations, the Imperial Navy extremely regrects that it is unable to meet the
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wishes of the Great British Admiralty < >.