Page 57 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

RISING SUN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 43

Britain persisted and continued to solicit the assistance of Japan. On 18th
December, unofficially, the British Navy sounded out the Japanese Naval Attache
Rear Admiral Oguri Kosaburo about sending battlecruisers to the Mediterranean.
But, Admiral Oguri replied that he could not comply since it was not a matter
22
for naval authorities but for the Governments to talk it over < >. Again, on the 13th
January 1915, Ambassador Greene sounded out Foreign Minister Kato on this mat-
2
ter. However; Greene could not obtain any concession from him < 3>.
Request concerning the Mediterranean
Subsequently, there was no request from Britain for over a year. But, as Ger-
man naval effort had been concentrating on commercial raiders, on 2nd February
1916, the British Admiralty communication to its Foreign Office: "The presence
of a flotilla of Japan~se destroyers in those waters would be of the greatest value
in view of the present demand for Allied vessels of this type. Tentative enquiry
has, from time to time, been made of the Japanese naval attache as to whether his
Government would be likely to accede to a request for a flotilla of destroyers to
be sent to the West, but no indication has been given that the Japanese Govern-
ment are considering the matter ... It would not be necessary to specify the Mediter-
ranean as their destination, since they could, if preferred, be employed in home
waters, thus releasing others for the Mediterranean. My Lords quite appreciate that
it may, on political grounds, be thought inadvisable to solicit the Japanese Govern-
ment for naval assistance in the West, but the practical necessities of the naval
situation make it. necessary to ask that the suggestion should be seriously con-
24
sidered < >.
Having received the above notification on the 4th February, Grey informed
Inoue of the present situation of the Royal Navy, and then asked quite informally
if they could obtain the agreement of the Japanese Government to despatch de~
stroyers to the Mediterranean. Grey also telegraphed the British Ambassador in
Tokyo the purport of the Admiralty•s request that they understood that the Japane-
se Government would not be justified in risking the loss of battleships by mines
or submarines at so great a distance from Japan. But they might be prepared to
consider the use of a flotilla of destroyers, which presumably involved much less
2
risk to the strength of the Japanese fleet< 5>. However, on 8th February, because
of the rapidly growing danger from German naval raiders at large from the Atlan-
2
tic to the Indian Ocean < 6>. The British Admiralty changed the proposing area of
the Japanese Naval operation from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, in
order to protect the transport route between Australia and asked for Aden and
27
destroyers to assist in pattoling the Maracca Strait< >. In reply, Minister Ishii Ki-
kujiro proposed the following conditions to Ambassador Greene if they were to
comply with the British request; firstly, the admittance of Japanese immigrants by
Australia and New Zealand, secondly, the Australian Governmenes agreement
to sign the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty,~ and thirdly, the repeal of restric-