Page 54 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

40 YOCHI HIRAMA

Nonetheless, on the 3rd, Grey approached Japan by way of precaution that
"if hostilities spread to the Far East and an attack on Hong Kong or Weihaiwei
were to take place, we should rely on their support" C3>. While, as Grey hoped the
Far East would remain out side of the War, on 4 August, he told Japanese Ambas-
sador in London, Inoue Katunosuke that Britain should avoid, if it could, to draw
4
Japan into any trouble< >. But on 7th August, Grey reversed his first proposal and
Ambassador Greene brought a most urgent message to Minister Kato which said,
"It is most important that the Japanese fleet should, if possible, hunt out and de-
stroy the armed German merchant cruisers who are now attacking our commer-
5
ce" C>. But, after transmitting this message, Grey again changed his attitude, and
attempted to keep the Far East out of the war, as the dominions of Australia and
New Zeal~nd, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States did not welcome
the participation of Japan into the war. Grey expressed his concern on the 9th,
and relayed to Ambassador Inoue on the lOth via Greene. He said to Minister Ka-
to that war in the Far East would trigger disturbances in China and spread to all
East Asia, thus dealing a heavy blow to British trade, and he requested Japan to
refrain until further instruction <6>.
But on the 1Oth in London, Grey also requested Ambassador Inoue to can cell
· invoking action under the Treaty to avoid international trouble and disturbance
7
of trade in China C>. While in Japan, the Okuma cabinet had already decided on
8th to give an ultimatum against Germany following the "first British request of
7th August. The cabinet by this time had reported to Emperor Taisho and had
received his approval to declare the ultimatum to Germany. Minister Kato stron-
gly opposed the British cancellation because it would everrurn the decisions alrea-
dy made, and, the cabinet would be put in an "extremely embarassing position".
After several negotiations, Grey finally conceded on 11th August for Japan to send
the ultimatum to Germany, but on condition that the cheater of operations be con-
8
fined to the German leasehold on land and the neighbouring China Seas < >. Fur-
thermore on the 12th, Grey handed over an Aide-Memoire to Ambassador Inoue,
in London, that "Japanese action will not extend beyond the Asiatic waters we-
stward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory with the exception of ter-
ritory on the Continent in Eastern Asia which is under German occupation (9).
Ambassador Inoue insisted that the Japanese Navy must protect her merchant ships
on the high sea, and should the German Eastern Squadron retreated to the German
Pacific Islands, the Japanese Navy would persue them. Such a limitation would
10
be unrealistic in naval operations < >. But, on the 14th August, Grey asked that
Japan should give assurances to other nations such as Australia, the United States,
the Nertherlands and others of its geographic areas of operations, since these coun-
tries always held the misapprehension that Japan had territorial ambitions, and
to announce that Japan had no intention of seizing German Islands in the Pacific
in any form 01). Due to these British concerns and proposals, Prime Minister Oku-
ma Shigenobu declared, at the meeting of All Japan Comercial Assembly that