Page 61 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

RISING SUN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 47

During the war, on 11 June 1917, Sakaki was attacked by German submarine
which killed 59 of the crew and wounded 22. The Second Special Squadron fought
36 times against German submarines from 15 April 1917 to 2 November, but
4
were unable to sink any < 9>. How did Britain asses the Japanese Navy's contribu-
tion in the Mediterranean? Before evaluation, I would like see what were the Allies
Naval capabilities in the Mediterranean. The naval situations in the Mediterranean,
according to Commander-in-Chief of British Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral G.C.
Dickens to Captain K.G.B. Dewar, Assistance Director, Plans ·Division was as
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follows ( >.
"People who study our situation at home might come to the conclusion that
we are not all badly off for anti-submarine forces. That the total produced by Great
Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and U.S. are formidable enough. All this is,
however illusory. Italy's share, except in certain narrow circumstances is infinitesi-
mal. Bar the protection of trafic creeping round her shores, and the protection is
of a poor standard, Italy will offer nothing towards any sort of the anti-submarine
warfare we like to wage, defensive or offensive. If she did, her Navy is so ineffi-
cient that her assistance would be of little value. France has not a large number
of efficient craft for a_nti-submarine purposes, and though the French are eager to
do all they can, they are on the whole incapable of running a sound naval cam-
paign. Their organization is not practical, and they somehow think on unsound
lines, and no sooner do you imagine you've roped them in to a concentrated effort,
than off they go diffusing their forces in every possible way. The Japanese are of
course splendid, but their numbers are small. The efficient Greek ships are so few
that they may be left out of the calula~ion. At present we have no sea-going Ameri-
can forces in the Mediterranean. They all work from Gibraltar out into the Atlantic''.
Diplomatically, King George V. expressed to the Japanese Ambassador his
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gratitude and admiration for the Japanese Navy's contribution < >. Also, the Bri-
tish senior naval Officer-in-Charge in Malta, Rear Admiral George Ballard repor-
ted to the Admiralty that "all destroyers and sloops based on Malta have been reserved
ever since my arrival on the station, but even so the number did not suffice to avoid
many delays until the arrival of a Japanese Flotilla at Malta in April 1917, whose
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assistance has been invaluable" < >. And also, he reported that "French standards
of efficiency are certainly lower than British however, and Italian standards are
lower still. With the Japanese it is otherwise. Admiral Sato's destroyer are kept
in a highly seviceable condition and spend at least as large a proportion of their
time at sea as our own, which is far from being the case with the French or Italian
vessels of any class. The Japanese moreover are very independent in all matters
of administration and supply whereas the French will never do anything for them-
selves if they can get it done for them" <B>.
Admiral Somerest Gough-Calthorpe, the British Mediterranean Commander-
in-Chief also expressed regard that ''Rear Admiral Sato has always placed the Japa-
nese destroyers at my disposal for escort work and I find their officers make no