Page 65 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

RISING SUN IN THE .MEDITER.llANEAN 51

assistance, and that the Japanese sea power projected to the Mediterranean was
commented as being "only a drop in the bucket" by the British Navy. But the Se-
cond Special Squadron accomplished great success in diplomatically supporting the
national interest. During and after the war, these destroyers visited 53 ports around
France, Britain, Italy, Belgum and Greece <7°>. In London, they participated in the
victory parade and could show that Japan had cooperated with Britain. In Paris,
Japanese sailors showed their existance not only to the citizens of Paris, but also
to the delegates of the Peace Conference. One of the member to the Paris conferen-
ce, Ambassador to Italy Hayasi Gonnosuke told Admiral Sa to that by the Japanese
activities in the Mediterranean, Japan was able to show her loyalty as an Ally and
obtain understanding of the Japanese contribution to this war. Hayashi said, "We
could show that Japan supported the Allies as an ·entente' and thus obtain position
as one of five big powers at the Paris Peace Conference" <71).
Among the Japanese crew, however, there was much resentment against the
British Navy, as the crew were always put on alert. They faced constant strong winds
and rough sea and they were closed in rolling small destroyers. As a result, they
were sick, and some committed suicide due to mental disorder. Lookouts fell into
the sea thrown by high waves. There arose uneasiness among the crew and many
complaints were made to Admiral Sato, as he complied to all of British requests.
They blamed Admiral Sato and Britain that "the commander was servile, we were
mercenaries", "we were like the lackeys of the British Navy" < >. Then at the Peace
72
Conference, the clause for abolishing racial discrimination was rejected because
of opposition from Australia, a British dominions. The unfavorable Japanese na- ·
val ratio compelled by an apparent conspiracy b~ the U.S. and British at the Wa-
shington and London conference, the fortification of Singapore immediately after
the cancellation of the Alliance developed portrayed an image of "ungrateful Bri-
tain" to the Japanese people <73>. The reason for these aggravated anti-British fee-
4
lings is explained by the Japanese Navy, as follows <7 >.
"Until World War I, Britain took full advantage of its relationship with Ja-
pan; fully employngJapan's military strength and goodwill at all times, including
the period of Imperial Russia's aggression to China, restraining of the Indian inde-
pendence movement, blocking of China's anti-foreign activities, and protection of
its dominions after it concentrated its fleets in the North Sea. Once peace resumed,
however, its attitude suddenly changed and Britain refused to give Japan even the
slightest concessions. This led to the Japanese isolation at the Paris conference and
the demand for the ratios of 5-5-3 for battleships at the Washington Conference,
the return of Shantung, the annulment of the Anglo:Japanese alliance, the conclu-
sion of the Nine Power Treaty, and eventually to all-out surppression of Japanese
trade".