Page 62 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

48 YOCHI HIRAMA

difficulties and have picked up their duties very satisfactorily" <54). But, because
of racial prejudice, or rivality of the British Navy against the Imperial Navy, or
international situation after the war, the Japanese Naval contribution was not fair-
ly evaluated. The staff of Malta, Captain Murry Pipon critisized that "Although
the ]aps very good when they knew exactly what they had got to do and all went
according to plan, but inferior to our men when unforseen situations cropped
up" <55>. Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe also looked upon Japanese Navy with racial
prejudice that "It is very improbable that the Japanese would consent to any of
their battle-cruisers joining the Grand Fleet, and even if they did, it is doubtful
whether they would be a match for German battle-cruisers when manned by Ja-
panese'' < >.
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It was after the W odd War 11 that the Second Special Squadron was given
fair reputation through the writing of Prof. I van Nish and Paul G. Halpern. Nish
evaluated that "If we try to asses Japan's naval contribution to the allied effort,
we have to conclude that it was considerable in the last stages of the war. It was
by no means the sole cause of allied success in meeting the submarine onslaught;
but it has to be numbered as one factor alongside the contribution of American
destroyers and the success of the British convoy system. Her contribution in the
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean was a great relief to the Royal Navy. Finally,
Japan's naval assistance was more valuable to Britain than to other members of
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the Entente who were less dependent on keeping open trade channels" <5 >. Paul
G. Halpern evaluated that the Japanese were nominally independent, but actually
carried out whatever orders they received from the British Commander-in-Chief
at Malta. The Japanese in fact worked very closely with the British, particulary in
escorting troopships. They soon gained an excellent reputation. Their ships were
new and well-handled, and the British paid them the ultimate compliment .... This
Japanese contribution of fourteen destroyers at a critical moment in the war against
submarines has been largely forgotten, but under the circumstances it was far from
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negligible" < >.
Why Japan despatched Destroyers and why not Battle-Cruiser to the European
Waters
AntiJapanese feeling and Relation with United States

Why did Japan accept despatching destroyers to the Mediterranean? Prime
Minister Terauchi Takeshi explained to Rear Admiral Sato the reason for the deci-
sion when Sato visited the Prime Minister upon his depature (59>. The Prime Mi-
nister told him that the reason was not just to fulfill Japan's duty under the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, nor to meet the demand of Britain. He said, we accepted
firstly, if Germany continues to use such violent operations, as a major power of
the world, it is our duty and responsibility to take strong measure against Germa-
ny in the name of just~ce and humanity. Secondly, our Allies are in great danger,