Page 134 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

134 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

By the time of the Third Crusade, expertise in horse transports had reached a high
level. The 14 vessels which Richard hired at Marseilles were called ‘busses’, each car-
rying 40 horse, 40 squires and 40 foot-soldiers, a potential force of over 500 knights and
infantry (although this was not the totality of his forces). Professor John Pryor’s research
th
into shipbuilding contracts in the 13 century reveal details about how horse transports
were constructed. In 1246, Louis IX ordered ‘12 round ships and 12 oared taride from
Genoa’, the latter being 35m long, with square sterns and three stemposts, allowing two
ports for dis/embarkation and stalls for 20 horses. Two decades later in 1268, contracts
for the Tunis Crusade, required three-decker roundships big enough to hold 100 horses.
These vessels were much the same length as the galleys, but had a depth of 10m, about
one-third below the water line, making them veritable floating towers. Not only did this
make them formidable in naval combat but also for attack on coastal fortifications.
The second part of this paper concerns the value of fleets to siege warfare. First, the
role of the Genoese fleet in capturing Jerusalem in 1099 should not be forgotten. This
might seem strange as the Holy City is some 50km from the coast! However, once the
First Crusaders had established siege lines in early June, it was apparent that in addi-
tion to a severe lack of water supplies, which emphasised the need for a quick assault,
there was an absence of wood for building siege towers. William of Embriaco, who
commanded the Genoese ships lying at Jaffa, the nearest port, had its vessels broken up
and the resulting timber and nails were then carried inland and reconstructed as wooden
towers. Not only did the Genoese ships provide materials but also the skilled personnel
for building and managing timber structures; for sailors understood the use of ropes and
pulleys, cranes and cantilevers essential to their employment against stone walls. The
city was taken by assault from two such towers on 15 July. This is a fine example of the
projection of naval power far inland; but most amphibious operations took place on the
Syrian Coast or in the Nile Delta, or as it turned out, in the Golden Horn.
If the new Christian territories in the Holy Land were to prosper, they needed to control
the coastline. This meant capturing the many Muslim-held and often fortified ports, which
was not possible to from the landward side alone, as blockade was the normal method of
capture and defenders could be resupplied from the sea. So, the Italian city states played
a crucial role in securing the ports and fortifications of the Syrian coastline from Antioch
in the north to Ascalon in the south, the first decade after the conquest. The Genoese fleet
contributed some 30 vessels to the siege of Arsuf (1100), 40 at Jebail and Lattakia (1103)
and 60 at Tripoli (1109); combined Genoese and Pisan fleets provided around 80 ships at
Acre (1104) and Beirut (1110); and over 70 Venetian ships at Sidon (1110). The last place
was the site of one the most famous sieges of the Ancient world, considered impregnable
until besieged by Alexander the Great. The other great success of that campaign, Tyre,
proved an even harder nut to crack. The Venetian Crusade of 1123-24 had this city as its
main target, the doge gathering more than 100 vessels for the task. The siege lasted from
January to July, 1124, and eventually ended in a surrender negotiated with the city’s lord,
the ruler of Damascus. This disappointed the ordinary crusaders who had hoped to benefit
from plunder had the place been stormed. It was the normal outcome of a blockade, how-
ever, which is how these early sieges were conducted. I will conclude with examples of