Page 510 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

510 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

The American draft proposal was written by officers of the US Armed Forces with less
or no advice of the State Department. Although these are minor differences they reflect
also the different legal and administrative traditions of each ally.
After a tough round of negotiations, the three powers – with the quick Allied
advance after “Overlord” in mind – adopted the final draft of a capitulation docu-
44
ment on June 25, 1944. It now consisted of 14 very broad articles of mainly military
character. Article 12 was a bit different: it ensured unlimited rules of engagement for
the three powers. 45 The preamble of this document reflected the evaluation of the
JCS, by emphasizing the total defeat of the Wehrmacht: “The German Government and
the German High Command, recognising and acknowledging the complete defeat of
the German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, hereby announce Germany’s
unconditional surrender.” German soldiers should be, according to Article 2b, regard-
46
ed as prisoners of war. But the Supreme Allied Commander should have a certain latitude
in this question. This final proposal had an attached cover letter in which some provi-
47
sions of the document were precised:
“Under Article 2 (b) of the draft Instrument of Surrender of Germany, there is no
obligation on any of the three Al- lied Powers to declare all or any part of the personnel
of the German armed forces prisoners of war: it is their right. Such a decision may or
may not be taken, depending on the discretion of the respective Commanders-in-Chief.
Prisoners of war so declared will be treated in accordance with the standards of interna-
tional law.” 48
Obviously the claims in this document had to be regarded as the lowest common
denominator, which urgently needed a clarification before the occupation began. In the
final proposal a Supreme Commander of Allied Forces is mentioned. But the cover letter
acknowledged the fact that there were three occupying powers with completely differ-
ent believe systems and intentions as what to do and how to get along with Germany
and the Germans. All this explanations, especially those made concerning Article 2b,
showed very clearly how small the lowest common de- nominator was.
Article 11 is also interesting. It stated that the Allies were allowed to deploy armed
forces and civil installations in all parts of Germany. This rather short statement is en-
hanced in the cover letter: “The Commission will submit for the consideration of the
three Governments a draft protocol on the Zones of occupation and the administra-

44 See in detail Hans-Günther Kowalski, “Die „European Advisory Commission“ als Instrument alliierter

Deutschlandplanung 1943 - 1945,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19, no. 3 (1971)., p. 271 – 272

45 This final draft can be found in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 256 – 261 (Minutes of the Seventh Formal Meeting of
the European Advisory Commission, Lancaster House, London, July 25, 1944, 6 p.m.)

46 FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 256 – 261, here p. 256
47 Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Goverments of the United States of America, the United

Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 25. July 1944, in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 254 –
256

48 Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Goverments of the United States of America, the United
Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 25. July 1944, in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, S. 255