Page 509 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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the vexations attendant on administering in detail a vast, hostile and bankrupt country,
smarting under defeat, distracted by dissension and confronted with countless prob-
lems arising out of the switch-over from war to peace economy.” 38
This consideration probably had its origins in British experiences in centuries of
colonial administration. In one form or another, many of the measures proposed in this
draft would later become daily routine in all four zones of occupation. All in all, this
draft proposal is not a document of capitulation, although these elements can be found
in some parts of the proposal, but a very complex set of agreements. The primary objec-
tive of this set of agreements was not only to define the German capitulation but also to
define the time of occupation. Trying to define the time of occupation can be seen as an
attempt in designing the phase of post- hostilities operations, or in other words “Hour
Zero”.
The Soviets submitted a very detailed military surrender document. Besides the
39
usual regulations, such as the handover of Allied prisoners of war, the transfer of war-
ships and aircraft, this proposal included a passage about the partition of Germany into
zones of occupation and an explicit statement of a German war guilt. According to this
Soviet proposal, all surrendering troops should automatically be declared to prisoners
of war. 40
The American proposal, drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was also the
41
shortest of all proposals. Unlike the others, the wording of the American document
was very general and limited to a military capitulation; consequently, it was named
42
“Draft Instrument and Acknowledgement of Unconditional Surrender” . From the
American perspective a more comprehensive declaration like the ones outlined by the
British and the Soviets would be counterproductive. Such a document could never fore-
see all problems and questions that could arise during the phase of occupation. Further-
more, a short declaration would offer much fewer legal possibilities of interpretation.
Otherwise the Germans could outmaneuver the Allied efforts. 43
In contrast to both, the British and the Soviet proposal, the author of the American
proposal was a military institution. On the British and the Soviet side, the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs had been as key actors responsible for formulating the proposals.

38 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated
15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 112 – 159, here p. 114

39 Memorandum by the Representative of the Soviet Union to the European Advisory Commission (Gousev),
dated 18. February 1944; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 173 – 179
40 Memorandum by the Representative of the Soviet Union to the European Advisory Commission (Gousev),

dated 18. February 1944; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 173 – 179, here p. 174: “The German Government and the
Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, recognising the complete defeat of Germany in the war
criminally begun by her against the United Nations, announce the unconditional surrender of Germany, and
request the cessation of hostilities against her.”
41 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, Washington 5. February 1944; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p.

167 – 170

42 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington, 15. February
1944, in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 167
43 See Memorandum in Support of U.S. Views; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 171 – 172