Page 504 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

504 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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turned after Stalingrad and that the United States’ en-trance into the war with its full
economic and military potential made the war unwinnable. A few numbers serve to illus-
trate this: In September 1944 the Army-Group B consisted of 12 Divisions with a total
of 84 Tanks. The frontline, the Army Group B was responsible for, stretched about 400
km. The Allied unites opposing them had 20 Divisions with 1700 Tanks available. 14
When the first GI’s entered Germany, they became eyewitnesses of the somber and grim
atmosphere of nearly devastated cities. As the military governor of Hessen described,
the GI’s “came into towns and cities that were deathly quiet, that smelled of death and
destruction. They came into villages where white flags were draped outside every door,
where faces could be felt, not seen, behind barricaded windows.” 15
On January 24, 1943 the Casablanca Conference proclaimed the “unconditional
surrender” of Germany as an Allied objective. The main purpose of this decision was to
prevent another “stab in the back legend”. 16 For occupying Germany, the Allies
needed a population that had under- stood why the Allies were doing what they were
doing. As the Directive JCS 1067 to the Commander in Chief of the American Forces
stated in April 1945:
“It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare and the
fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suf-
fering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have
brought upon themselves. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but
as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the
purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives. In the conduct of your occupa-
tion and administration you should be just but firm and aloof.” 17

13 For the Battle of Stalingrad see in detail Wegner, Bernd. “Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1942 - 1943.”
In Der Globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941 - 1943. Edited by
Horst Boog et al., 761–1102. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 6. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1990, here p. 962 – 1063; Glantz, David M. Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War: 1941-1943.
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005, p. 25 – 48
14 For details see Jung, Hermann. Die Ardennenoffensive 1944/45: Ein Beispiel für die Kriegführung Hitlers.

Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 12. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971, p. 33
– 44
15 Quoted after Gimbel, John. The American occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military; 1945 - 1949.

Stanford, Calif: Stanford Univ. Press, 1968, p. 6

16 For the history of the “stab in the back legend” see detailed Barth, Boris. Dolchstosslegenden und politische
Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1933. Schriften des
Bundesarchivs 61. Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003

17 Directive JCS 1076 to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation, Regarding the Military
Government of Germany; April 1945; in: US Department of State, ed. Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents. Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 21 – 33, here p. 23. JCS
1067 echoed in this case the opinion of President Roosevelt, who told Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson,
on August 26, 1944, that “[...] the German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the
whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization”, quoted
in Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995, p. 472 – 473, see also McAllister, James. No Exit: America and the German Problem,
1943-1954. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 50 – 53