Page 508 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

508 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

have never been part of the du- ties of this commission. Insofar the description and
definition of their duties as: “to study and make recommendations to the three Gov-
30
ernments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities” is
misleading. The EAC was not able to produce studies and to make recommendations
based on those studies due to the fact that the EAC had to depend on directives. This
commission had to discuss documents which were agreed upon to the last detail. The
European Advisory Commission could present those plans as recommendations to their
31
governments that had created those documents. At the same time, however, the EAC
was important and in the end indispensable for the cooperation of the allies. On the one
hand, each government had to make its mind about its own positions and had to have
them implemented as official policies before those positions could be forwarded to
the EAC. On the other hand, the Allies learned in detail about the political guidelines
of their partners as this was the case at the more or less periodical meetings of the “big
three” and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
The diplomatic preparations for establishing and installing the European Adviso-
ry Commission took a while, so that the EAC could begin its work by January 15,
1944 when the British Delegation presented a document “Terms of surrender for
Germany” 32 to the other members of the EAC. This document can be seen as four
33
documents in one: It contained a “Summary of Draft German Armistice” , the “Draft
35
German Armistice” itself , a document “Military Occupation of Germany” and another
34
36
on “Allied Control Machinery in Germany during the period of Occupation” . The doc-
ument entitled “Military Occupation of Germany” carefully examined different typed
of a mainly military occupation of Germany and also made suggestions how to divide
Germany into zones of occupation. 37 The British plan for a surrender document, the
“Draft German Armistice” was, with 70 articles carefully describing every detail of an
Allied takeover of Germany, very long. Except, that they should try not to be entangled
into the administration of that country:
“Conditions in Germany at the time of her surrender will almost certainly be cha-
otic, and the last thing the Allies will want to do is to saddle the High Command with all
30 Protocol signed at Moscow, November 1, 1942, Annex 2, in: FRUS 1943, Vol. I, p. 757

31 See Philip E. Mosely, “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn,” Foreign

Affairs 28, no. 4 (1950)., here p. 583

32 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated
15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 112 – 159

33 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated
15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 116 – 121

34 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated
15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 121 – 139

35 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated
15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 139 – 154

36 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated
15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 154 – 159
37 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated

15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 139 – 154, for the Zones of Occupation see map between pages
152 and 153