Page 511 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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tion of “Greater Berlin”.” This was – long before the Yalta Conference – about the
first mention of the division of Germany. Combined with the admission that a universal
treatment of Germany is impossible, a development is anticipated, that would become
official policy with the Crimean-Conference. 50
As late as October 1944, Eisenhower had sent his Chief of Staff, General Walter
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Bedell Smith , as representative of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) to the negotiations of the EAC. If Smith was the liaison between SHAEF
52
and the European Advisory Com- mission, then it was highly likely that at least he was
informed about the status and the progress of negotiations within the EAC. It was also
very likely that Eisenhower was informed by Smith about the progress made at the
meetings of the EAC. In fact, SHAEF was also informed about the work of the EAC
by the Combined Chief of Staff (CCS).
On April 25, 1945, troops of the US First Army linked up with Soviet units in
Torgau, meeting on the river Elbe. After Hitler committed suicide on April 30, Great-
Admiral Karl Dönitz was named as his successor. Within this so called “caretaker
government,” there was a dispute on how to bring this war to an end. It was, however,
not a dispute about the necessity of bringing the war to an end. According to Walter von
Lüdde-Neurath, Dönitz’ aide-de-camp, the admiral wanted “to end the war as quickly
as possible to spare further pointless sacrifice for friend and foe alike – but in a manner
“worthy of the unique struggle of the German people,” and above all to save as many as
he could from the horrors of Bolshevism.” Therefore, the Allied claim for an “uncondi-
53
tional surrender” seemed unbearable.
General Admiral von Friedeburg, the emissary sent by Dönitz, arrived in Eisenhow-
er’s headquarters at Reims in late afternoon of May 5, 1945. He received additional
support when Colonel General Jodl arrived. Both officers tried again to get the sepa-
54
rate surrender of the German units deployed to the Western front accepted. They failed
in achieving this goal. Instead they tried to soften the consequences of the inevitable
surrender of the Wehrmacht. They asked Eisenhower to grant a period of a maximum of

49 Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Goverments of the United States of America, the United

Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 25. July 1944, in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 255

50 Due to limitations in space, the dismemberment of Germany can just be mentioned. For further details see
Wilfried Loth, “Die deutsche Frage und der Wandel des internationalen Systems,” in Der Zusammenbruch
des Deutschen Reiches: Die Folgen des Weltkrieges, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller, Das Deutsche Reich und der
Zweite Weltkrieg 10/2 (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008), 201–378., p. 265 – 310; Dülffer, Jost.
Jalta, 4. Februar 1945: Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Entstehung der bipolaren Welt. 2 ed. München, 1998
nd
51 To the person of General Walter Bedell Smith see in detail Crosswell, D. K. R. Beetle: The life of General

Walter Bedell Smith.American warriors. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010
52 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, 18. October 1944, in: FRUS

1944, Vol. I, p. 354

53 Lüdde-Neurath, Walter. Unconditional Surrender: A Memoir of the Last Days of the Third Reich and the
Dönitz Administration. Barnsley: Frontline, 2010, p. 43, see also Heinrich Schwendemann, ““Deutsche
Menschen vor der Vernichtung durch den Bolschewismus zu retten”: Das Programm der Regierung Dönitz
und der Beginn einer Legendenbildung,” in Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland, ed. Jörg Hillmann and John
Zimmermann (München: Oldenbourg, 2002), 9–33.

54 See Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Vol. IV / 2, p. 1478, further cited as KTB OKW