Page 507 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ation. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wanted to limit the scope for decision-making of
the EAC to the preparation of a document of capitulation. The reason for this aim was
the fear that the US would limit its own room for maneuver if the authority of the Eu-
ropean Advisory Commission was too broad. The other main factor was the fear to get
caught in the matters of post-war Europe:
“It is vitally necessary to indoctrinate the American people to a recognition of the
national responsibility of the country in world affairs. It is essential that the people of
America become used to decisions being made in the United States. On every cracker
barrel in every country store in the U. S. there is someone sitting who is convinced that
we get hornswoggled every time we attend a European conference. European delibera-
tions must be made in the light of the concepts of the new continent because that con-
tinent has now, for better or for worse, become a determining factor in the struggles of
the older one. What may be lost through not moving to London in the way of better and
more accessible records or a greater familiarity with local conditions, will be made up
in a readier assumption of responsibility on the part of the U. S. and perhaps in a greater
objectivity of decision.” 26
Obviously all actors on the American side had vivid memories of the isolationist
tendencies in the 1930’s that had led to the Neutrality-Acts of 1937 and 1939. 27 The
Americans believed – in order to avoid the repetition of these tendencies – and to have
still all options available – that the work of the EAC should be limited to the preparation
of a German capitulation. 28 Another factor that caused concern on the American
side was its complex bureaucratic apparatus working be- hind the scenes. It was vir-
tually impossible to keep track of all the position papers and recommendations the
various working groups, sub-committees and agencies produced. Combined with some
interagency rivalry – especially between the JCS and the Working Security Commit-
tee (WSC) of the State Department – most of these papers were stalled somewhere in
the process. Especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed many of these plans: “For the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, ambitious postwar programs that created civilian obligations for
the army were distinctly unappealing.” 29
The EAC suffered from the circumstance that her members were directly dependent
on the guidance from their respective governments. The commission’s charter did not
include authority to propose initiatives. Approaching problems on their own initiative

26 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins), Cairo, 25. November

1943; in: FRUS 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, S. 418

27 For the discussion about the Neutrality of the United States in the 1930’s see in detail:Schwabe, Klaus.
Der amerikanische Isolationismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Legende und Wirklichkeit. Frankfurter historische
Vorträge 1. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1975; Powaski, Ronald E. Toward an Entangling Alliance: American
Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901 - 1950. Contributions to the study of world history 22. New
York: Greenwood Press, 1991; Adams, Bianka J. From Crusade to Hazard: The Denazification of Bremen
Germany. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2010, p. 1 – 2
28 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins), Cairo, 25. November

1943; in: FRUS 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, p. 418
29 Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944 - 1949

(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996)., p. 27; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of
the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000)., p. 107 – 109