Page 506 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

506 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

the Alliance, had not been consulted in this question. 20
The direct result of this tension of Allied affairs was the creation of a European
Advisory Com- mission (EAC) at the Moscow conference of the Allied Ministers of
Foreign Affairs (October 19
21
– 30, 1943). The first duty of this newly formed commission was “to study and
make recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected
22
with the termination of hostilities.” Based in London the European Advisory Com-
mission consisted of Sir William Strang for the United Kingdom, Fedor T. Gusev for
the USSR, and John G. Winant for the US. Gusev as well as Winant were ambassadors
of their countries in the United Kingdom. Further- more, their assignment to the EAC
was only one of several other and competing duties and obligations: “With substantial
external respectabilities and small staffs, the three men could barely manage their broad
and diffuse EAC assignment.” The business done by the EAC may serve as an example
23
for the various approaches and traditions of the involved states.
The British side, for example, welcomed the proposal to install the EAC, made by
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. The American side, however,
24
was very reluctant to accept this proposition. The British Foreign Office wanted a
mandate as wide as possible, in order to discuss questions concerning not only the
enemy states but also the smaller states in Europe. The commission should also be
entitled to settle questions regarding ethnic minorities and borders. It would appear that
this holistic British approach was on the one hand a product of many years of diplomatic
experience and on the other hand a product of the circumstance that forced the Allies to
work together if they want to defeat Hitler. From the British point of view, precisely
this obligation to succeed, combined with American troops in Europe, enabled them to
negotiate these items during the war. 25
The American position was different because of its difficult domestic political situ-

20 See Hans-Günther Kowalski, “Die „European Advisory Commission“ als Instrument alliierter

Deutschlandplanung 1943 - 1945,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19, no. 3 (1971)., here p. 269; see
also Gerhard Schreiber, “Das Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzuges und der Krieg in Italien 1943 - 1945,”
in Die Ostfront 1943 / 44: Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten, ed. Karl-Heinz Frieser et al., Das
Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 8 (München: Dt. Verl.-Anst., 2007), 1100–62., here p. 1118

21 The history, organization and tasks of the “European Advisory Commission” are described in Hans-Günther
Kowalski, “Die “European Advisory Commission” als Instrument alliierter Deutschlandplanung 1943
- 1945,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19, no. 3 (1971)., for the conference of the Allied Foreign
Ministers in Moscow see in detail FRUS 1943, Vol. I, p. 513 – 781

22 Protocol signed at Moscow, November 1, 1942, Annex 2, in: FRUS 1943, Vol. I, p. 757
23 Eisenberg, Carolyn W. Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944 - 1949.

Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. p. 26

24 See in detail Harper, John L. American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and
Dean G. Acheson. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 180 – 181

25 For example: The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, London, 4. January
1944; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 1, for further details see Philip E. Mosely, “The Occupation of Germany: New
Light on How the Zones Were Drawn,” Foreign Affairs 28, no. 4 (1950)., here p. 581 – 582; Gaddis, John L.
The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000,
p. 106 – 107; Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944
- 1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996)., p. 24 – 26