Page 79 - Atti 2014 - La neutralità 1914-1915. la situazione diplomatica socio-politica economica e militare italiana

I SeSSIone - l’ItalIa dIplomatIca 79

certainly not fearing a serious attack from Italy since this time. 10
The second and much less known military option was the employment of Ita-
lian forces along the Upper Rhine to support the Germans left wing in its attack
of France. This had been included in the military agreement of 1888 but was not
fine-tuned until 1908. In the General Staff’s annual deployment directives, this pa-
ragraph was short and made the employment dependent on the political situation.
In 1905, the phrasing was for example as follows:

“The deployment of an Italian army consisting of five army corps and two ca-
valry divisions at the Upper Rhine has been prepared. Its preparation is dependent
on the political situation.” 11
The deployment directives of 1906 made detailed descriptions of the units,
th
th
the period of the expected arrival between the 7 and 26 day of mobilization
and the marshaling area along the line of Strassburg – Kenzingen – Breisach. All
deployment directives between 1906 and 1913 include the last remark that “given
the current political situation, the arrival of the Italian army should not be counted
on.” 12
The designation of General Alberto Pollio as Chief of the Italian General Staff
in 1908 had improved the relationships on the military level because Pollio com-
bined the modernization of the army with operational support of the Triple Al-
liance. Still, this had not much effect on the factual deployment planning, because
– as a consequence of the war in Libya – Pollio sent a note to Berlin in December
1912 stating that Italy was currently not able to guarantee the obligation. But for
Moltke, this was no reason to worry. Rather, it was the proof to him that the Italian
General Staff took this obligation seriously and that Pollio was a realistic partner.
He therefore invited Pollio to intensify the considerations for cooperation beyond
the current situation and he sent his deputy, Major General Georg von Waldersee,
to lead talks in Rome and Vienna. 13
In May 1913 the technical details of the railway transport via Austria were
finalized in detail and in September Pollio participated in the German autumn

10 Afflerbach, Dreibund, p. 461, and Stefan Schmidt, “Frankreichs Plan XVII: Zur Interdependenz
von Außenpolitik und militärischer Planung in den letzten Jahren vor Ausbruch des Großen
Krieges,” in Schlieffenplan, 221-256, here 230.
11 Mobilization calendar for the 1905/1906 deployment plan. Quoted in “Editionsteil,” in Schlief-
fenplan, 339-484, here 394.
12 Ibid, 414.
13 [Georg] Graf von Waldersee, “Von Deutschlands militärpolitischen Beziehungen zu Italien,“
Berliner Monatshefte für internationale Aufklärung. Die Kriegsschuldfrage 7 (1929): 636-663,
here 641-642. For Pollio’s role see also Maurizio Ruffo, l’italia nella triplice alleanza: i piani
operativi dello SM verso l’Austria Ungheria dal 1885 al 1915 (Rome: Stato maggiore dell‘eser-
cito, 1998), pp. 33-34.