Page 75 - Atti 2014 - La neutralità 1914-1915. la situazione diplomatica socio-politica economica e militare italiana
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I SeSSIone - l’ItalIa dIplomatIca                                    75



             The Italian Factor
             in German Operational Planning, 1914



             Mr. Markus PöhlMann        1



                n late October 1917, General Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, chief of staff
                               th
             I of the German 14  Army, followed the breakthrough of his troops at Caporetto.
             Approaching Cividale, Krafft described his overwhelming feelings:

                   “A breathtaking view […] across the Italian plain right down to the Adria.
                   All over the valley, fires and detonations announced the retreat of the Ita-
                   lians, who hastily destroyed their depots. Lorries crashed, ambulances rol-
                   led over, prepared but unfinished blastings, equipment scattered all over,
                   food of all kind, among it big-bellied bottles with delicious olive oil – a
                   welcome booty for our machine gunners […].” 2

                The topic in question gains its dramatic effect from the view back on the Battle
             of Caporetto of 1917. It was when a German army invaded the eastern border of
             the Kingdom of Italy. Had it been the decision of the military decision makers
             of 1914, an Italian army factually would have attacked from German territory
             towards France. What a remarkable change in the forces and direction of attack!
                Much ink has been spilled over the greater questions of strategy and political
             alliances, i.e.
                the question why Italy did not sent troops to Germany in 1914. So far, there
             has been less focus on the military dimension of the Triple Alliance history and
             the actual military plans and preparations up to Italian’s declaration of neutrality
             in the summer of 1914.
                For one part, this might be a consequence of the archival situation: The bulk of
             the German military records was destroyed during an air raid on Potsdam in April
             1945. Nevertheless, over the last years, the history of German military planning




             1   Mark Pohlmann is a German historian. He works at the Center for Military History and Social
                 Sciences of the Bundeswehr in Potsdam. His research interests lie in the German military histo-
                 ry, in the history of the secret services and the relationship between war and the media.
             2   Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, Der Durchbruch am Isonzo: 2 vols., vol. 1: Die Schlacht von
                 Tolmein und Flitsch 24. bis 27. Oktober 1917 (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1926), p. 119. The fact that
                 the use of precious olio extra vergine for cleaning machine gun locks and barrels constitutes an
                 act of culinary barbarism will not be debated here.
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