Page 76 - Atti 2014 - La neutralità 1914-1915. la situazione diplomatica socio-politica economica e militare italiana

76 la neutralità 1914 - 1915. la situazione diplomatica socio-politica economica e militare italiana

3
has been fueled by the discovery of new documents. But it cannot be concealed
that the subject of a German-Italian military relationship has actually remained a
neglected side issue.
This paper will therefore firstly describe the military dimension of the alliance
politics between about 1888 and 1914 and give a short overview of the German
war plan. This will be followed by a few remarks on the assessment of the Italian
military potential by the German partners. Finally it will be concluded with an as-
sessment of the factual considerations and plans for a military collaboration in the
event of a war. The question is as follows: What role did Italy or the Italian armed
forces play in the German war planning before 1914?

The military implications of the Triple Alliance up to the end of 1912

As is generally known, the basis for all following military agreements was the
4
Triple Alliance of 1882. This was defensively oriented and did not contain any
technical provisions with regard to military support. The provisions were firstly
concretized in the German-Italian military agreement of 28 January 1888 where
the government of Francesco Crispi announced that they send six army corps and
three cavalry divisions to the Rhine in the event of a war against France. 5
With regard to naval warfare in the Mediterranean Sea, the German-Austro-
Hungarian-Italian navy convention of 1900 represented a minimum solution for
combined warfare in the Mediterranean. The convention was motivated by the
Italian worries about French landing operations and initially only envisaged the
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delineation of the areas of operation as well as technical details. On land and at
sea, the agreements remained relatively noncommittal, even when the generally
announced support of six corps looked meaningful on paper.

3 Cf. Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Groß, eds., Der Schlieffenplan: Analysen
und Dokumente (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006). (English translation in preparation).
4 For the German side, see the magisterial study by Holger Afflerbach, Der Dreibund: Europäi-
sche Großmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau,
2002). With focus on Austria-Hungary see Hans Jürgen Pantenius, Der Angriffsgedanke ge-
gen Italien bei Conrad von Hötzendorf: Ein Beitrag zur Koalitionskriegsführung im Ersten
Weltkrieg. 2 vols. (Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau, 1984).
5 Gian Enrico Rusconi, “Das Hasardspiel des Jahres 1915: Warum sich Italien für den Eintritt in
den Ersten Weltkrieg entschied,” in Der Kriegseintritt Italiens im Mai 1915. Ed. by Johannes
Hürter and Gian Enrico Rusconi (Munich: Oldenburg, 2007), 13-52, here 20.
6 Rüdiger Schiel, Die vergessene Partnerschaft: Kaiserliche Marine und k.u.k. Kriegsmarine
1871-1914 (Bochum: Winkler, 2014), pp. 110-111.