Page 81 - Atti 2014 - La neutralità 1914-1915. la situazione diplomatica socio-politica economica e militare italiana

I SeSSIone - l’ItalIa dIplomatIca 81

Multinational operations in the Mediterranean Sea
The Italo-German military relations are incomplete without the agreement of
the navies of 1913. The basis for this had been the mentioned navy convention
of 1900. This had not envisaged any combined operational coordination in the
event of a war. The idea in 1912 to develop this convention did not stem from the
admiral staffs but from General Pollio. On the one hand, this was for him a com-
pensation for the cancellation of the troop transports; on the other hand he was
worried about the protection of the Italian coast. Moltke was happy to back up
this initiative. The second navy convention was concluded on 23 June 1913 and
18
entered into force on 1 November 1913. In the event of a war, the plan was to ga-
ther around Sicily the navies of Italy, Austria-Hungary and Germany lying in the
Mediterranean Sea. These divisions were to be put under the command of an Au-
strian Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Anton Haus, and after having gathered were
19
to attack the French fleet in the Western Mediterranean. Out of consideration for
the Italian relations, the British fleet was carefully avoided here. This convention
is remarkable in several ways: Firstly, it established a connection between land
and sea operations and therefore pursued a really strategic approach. Additionally,
it formed the basis for the military cooperation of Austrian and Italian units under
a single command. For the German historians, the particular interest comes from
the fact that it was based on Moltke’s initiative. By contrast to the Italian armed
forces, the German Chief of the General Staff was not given supreme command
over the navy in the event of a war. Even in peacetimes he was not involved at all
into operational plans of the navy. One could therefore argue that the necessity to
cooperate with Italy for the first time develops a strategic impulse with Moltke.

Conclusion
For a conclusion, let us remember General Krafft’s emphatic description of
Caporetto. Studying the Italian factor in German planning prior to 1914 provides
an exotic appeal on the operational level and it provokes some thrilling, counter-
factual questions: Was there ever a historical option for, say, General Liugi Zuc-
cari observing the attack of his troops into the similar bucolic French provinces
across the Rhine in August 1914? Would three Italian corps on the Western Front
have brought about a different development?

18 Wolfgang Foerster, “Die deutsch-italienische Militärkonvention,“ Berliner Monatshefte für in-
ternationale Aufklärung. Die Kriegsschuldfrage 5 (1927): 395-416, here 400-402, and Schiel,
Partnerschaft, pp. 116-121.
19 For Haus cf. Paul G. Halpern, anton Haus: Österreich-Ungarns Großadmiral (Graz Köln, Wien:
Styria, 1998).