Page 338 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
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           and che inc:roduction of armour co cover the vita! pans of ships agaiost explosive
           shc:lls,  rhe incroducrion of underwacer weapons such as torpedoes and  mines. all
           had led  ro the  idea rhar co  counter che  overwhelming superioricy of especiaJly che
           Brirish Royal  Navy it was neccssary co employ such modero technologies aboard
          small inél<pensive, fighcing crafc co prevem blockades and amphibious attacks, and
           ro  acquire sea-going vessels whkh could ouc run heavier arrned warships and at·
           cack che lines of communicadon of the scronger enemy. This li ne of chinking, found
           irs mosc outspoken advocate in che French Admiral Théophile Aube wich lùs "Jeune
           Ecole"  in che  1880's.
              A visionary advocate of commerciai expansion in che Unired Stares was Rear
           Admiral Roberr W . Shufeldr, who had mken pan .in the "ope.rllng-up" of Korea
           in  1882 and larer became chairman of che  N a val Advisory Board. H e convinced
           che N a val Affairs Comminee of che House ofRepresentacives chat the Navy should
           be composed of scrong warships for coastal defense a nd fase sea-going cruisers for
           a  gutrrt de  cour1e.
              Bue evenrs such as the Samoan crisis of 1889, che Chilean war scare of 189l-92
          and che coup in Hawaii in 1893 showed that large srrong sea-goiog armoured ships
           might be in difficulry against smaller  unprotecred cruisers or gunboars. Such ex·
           periences opened the way for tht> mosc inOuendal America n theorisr on naval warfart>,
           Captain  Alfred Thayer Mahan with his " Classica) School".  In  his opinion naval
           wars were foughr for the contro! of the sealines of communkacion.  A sea•power
           could use che SLOC's in her area of concrol and ro win contro! of the seas, whether
           regionally or globally,  the sea-power needed a  Oeer v.•hich could defear the naval
           forces of an opponenr in a decisive sea.J>anle. Far such decisive oaval bacr:les berrer
           batcleships and safe bases were necessary.  With contro!  of the seas won aU  ocher
           pcoblems couJd be solved. The defeoce of ooe's own coasrs and harbours, the deoi-
           al of SLOC's ro the enemy, the blockading of che enemy's harbours, and even am-
           phibious armcks againsr his shores could be ensuted.
              Mahan was called by the founder of rhe U.S. Naval War College,  Rear Ad-
           miral Stephen B. Luce, co teach there. In his lecrures he traced Britain's use of sea
           power co build up ber world-wide rrade colonial empire and to fìnaUy become the
           dominane power in the world. His books on "'The lofiueoce of Sea  Power  upon
           H.istary", published in  1890 and 1892, became the b.ible for his followers in many
          countdes. and won  more and more suppon in the U nired Statcs, e.speciall.y when
           io 1897, he published a  new book " The lnreresc of America in Sea  Power", jn
           wlùch he poinred ouc tbac mosc of the faaors which  had made Greac "Brirain so
           powerful were also pocentially presenc  in  che  Uniced States.
              One of his sraunchesr supponers was Theodore Roosevelt, who  in  1897 was
           che Assist-an t Secretary of the Navy. Together with other  followers an d supporrers
           of commerciai expansion be pushed the reluctanr Presideot William McKinley a od
           che Secretary of the Navy,John D. Long, into tbe war with Spain, using the cruel
           suppression of Cuban nacionaliscs by the Spanish colonia! authorities as a  pretexr
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