Page 339 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

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and by supporting che warmongers cries of saborage battleship, rhe Maint, blew
up io tbc harbour of Ha vana because of an accidcnral municions explosion. Wirh
che compiere destruaion of che Spanish naval forces in the Philippincs by che Amcri·
can Squadron un der Rear Admiral George Dewey in che Barde of Manila Bay on
l May 1898 chis Spanish col.ony lay open ro be exploiced by rhe Uniced Scaces.
And the complete defeat of thc Spanish Fleec io rhe Barde of Sa oriago on 3 July
1898 enabled che fumy forces which had already landed on Cuba co be mengch·
cncd and this island and Puuco Rico robe conqucred. W i eh chis viccory over Spain
che United St<.ttes joined rhe ranks of che compedng world powers.
The Amecican impcrialisrs looked oo che Philippiocs as an imporrane step·
ping srone in rhe conquest of new markers for Americao produccs in the densely
populared areas ofEast Asia. When che "Boxer" uprising in China in 1900 chrea-
tened co drive che European n11tions, rrying co divide China inco inOuence zones,
ouc of che country, che U.S. Navy joined che incernational expcdicions, so confìrm-
ing che 1\merican goal of an ''open door" economie policy, and aga in cmphasizing
rhe need of a sea-going Oeet for power pcojection. The Army. for a long cime con-
cerned only wirh che internai defense, now had tO subdue an uprising nfPhilippinc
nadonalists and a Iso bccame nn inscrumeor of tbc impcrialiscic policy of Theodorc
Roosevek Elecred as Vicc-Prcsidenc, he became Prcsidenc following che assassina·
rion ofMcKinley in Sepccmber 1901. To underscore his "big stick" policy be had
co be able co concentrare the American fleec ac rhe crisis poims in rhe Aclantic or
in the.Pacifìc fascer dlBn was possible by going round Cape Horn. So he focced
Panama co separate from Colombia so thac che Panama Canal, cben undcr con·
srruction, would be primnrily under American conrrol. To demonstrace Amc:rican
dominanC'c of che approaches co rhe Cnnal he tried co pcevent fu m re intervcmions
by me Europea n powers in this area :u was the case in che Venezuelan crisis of 1903.
T o build up thc fiect co the srandard he believed neccssary, Thcodore Roosevclc
nccded che threac of a crack 10 gcr Congress co approve his big naval programs. Up
to the hm 19th ccnrury hiscorical experieoce always suggesced RBd!Grear Britain
as the possìble opponem. Bue then German expansion in che Far East, which had
led w confronrarions such as in che Samoan crisis of l889 or off Manila Bay in
1898, rhe German acquisition of thc former Spanish Paci fie islands in 1900, and
. German intcrvendon in rhe Caribbean such as in che Venezuelan and Dominican
criscs of 1903-04, a.s wcll as Germany's big oava.l progcams of 1898 and 1900,
l<!d che American Slracegic " rhink canks", acche Naval War College and che Gener-
ai Board of the Navy, ro consider Germany as che mosc dangecous oppooenr.
Scenarios wcrc workcd ouc in which a German neec mounred amphibious opcn.l·
rions againsr some shores in Centrai America.
Despire rhe facr rhat such operacions by che Germans becnme more and more
unlikely with che rcalignmcnc of alliances in Europe and thc concentracion
of che Bridsh Flect in Home Warcrs againsc che cxpaoding Gecman Ho~hseef/oll~.
American naval planning held up "defence" againsc 8/ack/Germany as che mosc