Page 341 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

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attencion ro rbe danger of a furure coalition of eicher Grcat B.rirain or Germaoy
and Austria wirh Japan and Russia, a threat which called for a 'Navy secoo.d ro
none'. Re-elecred, Wilson had co accept the cali for pa.ricy with the scrongesc navy
of the world, and Congress passcd che biggest appropriation bìll up co that ti me
no less than 16 new bactleships and ba[[Jecruisers and 10 scour cruisers.
Before this big program could be scarced, che Germans declared cheir 'Unres·
rricted U-boac War·, and the disclosure of che 'Zimmermann-1clegram', incercepr·
ed, deciphered and released 10 che press by che British, forced Wilson ro declare
war on the side of the Allies. The big-sbip program had ro be suspended in order
10 save che Bricish in chcic greacesc crisis by rurning che grear industriai and ship·
building capacicy m mass produce destroyers, escorcs, and merchant ships. fc was
Rear A.dmiral William S. Sims, senc over co find ouc bow rhe U.S. Navy could help
Bricain co overcome che crisis, who persuaded the reluccanc British A.dmi.ralcy co
introduce che convoy system.
Tbe army, whicb had beeo well below che strengrh auchorized by Coogress
since che curo of rhe cenrury and had been too involved in discussing wherher it
should be reorganized i neo a Regular A.rmy or a milicia, was forced by rhe Nadonal
Defense Ace of 1916 ro uoderrake a vasr expansioo.
The increases were jusc scarring when che Uoired Srares joioed rhe Allies. W il·
son senr Generai John J. Pershing, who h ad led the forces in border dashes wirh
Mexico, ro France ro find our how many rroops mighr be needed in Europe and
how chey might be used. Pershi.ng called for ar leasr one million men up ro rhe
end of 1918 ro build up an independenc fighting force of 20 divisions, only ro io·
crease his request in che next momhs co 30 and then ro 52 divisions in order ro
overcome che Alli ed crisis on the Western Fronr, following the collapse of Russia.
T o accomplisb such an increase ir was necessary ro introduce a 'Selecrive Servi ce
Aa', ro escablisb recruicing and uaining cemers, t0 requisirion ships for uaosporr·
iog croops co Europe, and ro come ro some agreemenr with tbc Freoch aod Brirish
on command arrangemenrs and che assignment of the arriving A.merican rroops.
The effi:crs of t:he America o milicary and oaval parricipatioo in the lJ!,st cwo years
of che Firsr Wodd War are well known and need no repecidon here, because they
- with che e:xceprion of che convoy·proposal - did not come from any special
Americao strategie ideas. More importane rbey were che consequence of political
ideas. WiJson, who io his idealistic vision, documenred in his 14 Point Proclama·
rion, rhoughr he was fighciog a war ro make che world safe for democracy. To sol ve
inrernarional conflicu he proposed the ''League ofNations", But with the war ov!!f
he was ro learn chac che viccorious European democracies concinued in rheir old
power policics. Disappointed he rerurned from the peace negociacions and curned
his back on che old world scruggles. This arti rude was shared by most of rhe A.meri·
can pu~lic. Congress was not willing ro rarify rhe peace rreaties or appwve joining
the "League of Nations". A rising creod of isolationism brougbr the Republicans
back inro power in 1920.