Page 345 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

AlTnNATING snAT!iGIC CONCEI"TS 31l

enough to saengthtn Bricain's and France's power of resiscance by giving materia l
a id as envisagtd in Rainbow Ont. So afccr a fcw wceks, be h ad amcnded the neurrali·
ty la w by introducing a caJh-tmd,.farry dause. He goc che approvai of Congress by
esrablishing wa~ zontJ which were off limirs w aU American ships and citizens in
order co avoid facal incidents as had occured in che First World War.
lacer, che Foreign Secrecaries of che America n States agrecd on a 'Panamcri·
ca n Securiry Zone' which was esmblished ac tbc Panama Cooferencc on 2nd Oeto·
ber 1939. Rooscvelt insùruted a neuaaliry parrol by the U.S. Adancic Squadron
which hc had already improvised in Scptember 1939, and hc envisaged thcm as
insaumcnts ro supporc Allied naval warfarc.
Thc rapid Gcrman victories in both Norway and France caused a shock and
led Roosevelt ro start a second phase ofhis policy. With the Frcnch Army demoycd
and tbc British Navy cndangcrcd by che imminent German invasion, a German
thrust into che Western Hemisphere via Wcsr Africa and Brazil could no longer
be excluded. T o dcprivc Gcrmany of bases for su eh operations by taking over che
European colonies in che H emispherc was considered, and amphibious expcdlrions
co gai n con eroi of thc Vichy·gòvcrncd Antillcs, thc Portugucse A:cores, and [he Spn·
nish Cape Verde lslands werc planned. In )une 1940 a 'rwo Owm NariiJ/ Program
and a fast rearmnment progrnm forche Army and rhc Army Air Porcc werc srarced.
Convinced o( Britain's S[cadfascness by rcports from his cmissarics nnc.l by
his direct comacts with Prime Minisrer, Winston S. Churchill, Roosevelt decided
despite n numbcr of sccptical warnings, co supporc Brimin by cvery means 'shorc
of war'. Even rhc wldcspread isolationisc ccndencics an d che clecrion campaign di d
not prevenr him from pushing che 'Dcsrroycr Naval Base Dcal' through. Aftcr bcing
elecred for an unprecedentcd third tcrm Roosevelt inicinced the 'Lend Lcasc Act',
v.•hich afrer bitter debatc was npproved by Congress in March 1941.
But Bri01in sccmcd to nced more help. Already a fcw days after his rc·elc:ction,
on che recommcndauon of the Chief of N a val Operacions, Admiral Harold R. Scark,
Rooseveh decìded ro ncccpt Srnrk's ' Pian Dog', which brought Rai11boru Four up
rodate. This pian becamc che basis for che secrec American-British-Canadian (ABC)
staff conferc:nce which in turn became the basis for War Pian Rai11how Five, which
was formaUy approved by che Secrecaries ofWar and che Navy on 2ndJunc 1941.
Ics &~~ Firsl srraregy became the fìrm ground oo which che Allies would base
chcir furure policy. Using the incelligcnce provided by Churchill on German incen-
nons, based mainly o n Bletchley Park's deciphering of German radio signals · 'UI·
tra·, · Roosevclc srep by step aUowed thc U .S. Adancic Fleer co enter the Bacde of
the Arlantic. In Aprii the U.S. fleer took over che defensc of Greenland and then
rhe limi t of rhe parrol zone of the Wesrern Hemispherc was extended co 30° W est,
and in Junc this limit was push.ed to 6° W . 25% ofche Pncifìc Pleer was transfer·
red inro the Atlantic, nn d in July che fleer undcrcook rhe defense of lceland, an d fì.
nally - afrer che Aclanric Conferente - on l Sepcember 1941 rhc A.-nericnns cook
over operational conrrol of the Alli ed Norch Adanric convoys from New Foundland
up co rhe area south of lceland and issued a siJool on sig!Jr order againsc Axis ships.