Page 342 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

308 J0Ml EN ~OHWER
While the Army was conccrncd with the dcmobilizarion orics focces, che Navy
plaoncrs saw a serious furure danger cmerging from che Anglo-Japanese aJJiance
which adde.d co che already superior Bricisb Flcer che strengch of a new Japanese
program of bujlding 8 new big bard.esbips and 8 bacclecruiscrs. T o counrcr rhis
'thn-ar' they asked for the 1916 buildjng program nnd askcd fora doubling ofthis
program for 1919.-Bur Congress rejecced this program. Presidcnc Warrcn G. Hard-
ing's ncw governroeor urged a rcruro to 'normalcy' aod Congress passed a resolu·
don for a reducrioo in armamenrs.
So che Secrerary of Stare, Charles E. Hughes invired the five big na.val powers
ro a disarmameot cooference in Washington, and surprised the parcicipancs ac thc
fìrsc plenary session wich a proposal of a 'ten-year holiday' in baccleship conscruc·
rion and scrapping 30 American, 23 British and 17 Japanese bacdeships which
werc outdaced or on che slipWlly so as co rea eh a ratio of ): ) :3 for rhe Amcrican,
British andJ apancse navies. The public and che press ali aver rhe world acdaimed
rhcse proposals enchusiasticl)•. Aftcr tough negoriations, which inc.ludcd ngreements
rcgarding the non-fortifìcation of che Paci fie islands. che abrogation of the Bridsh-
Japancse alliance and che rec:ognirion o( the Far Easccrn posscssions and che princi-
ple of an "open-door" policy in China, che creacy was signed on 6d1 February 1922,
binding five powers, Fr:tnce and lwly had been added and wcre gcamed a ratio
of l . 75 cach. 10 rhe memioned proposals.
Up co 1936 Congress and the PrcsidentS thought chac rhc Unircd Scaccs should
avoid bcing drawn imo furure conOiccs nnd wars wirh ochcr major powcrs. Only
the military and naval strength ncccssary for defensc had co be maintaincd.
In che ea.rly 1920's che idCll 'rhe Navy is dlc fhsr line of defeosc' was ques·
tioncd by Brigadier Generai William Mitcheli, who had won fame as leader of Al·
licd air forccs in france. An able propagandisc of air powcr as rhc decisive force
io any furure war. he rtied, by organiz.ing intercoocinencal Oighc:s and bombing ac-
tacks on old batdeships, co convince the public and Congress thar with a strong
indcpendcnr Air Force thc orher rwo services mighc be unnccccssary for d1e defence
of che United Statcs. When rhcir leaders di d not accepr an independem Alr Force,
he arrad:cd them publidy as incompercnc and accuscd them of cri minai ncgligence.
This led ro his courc-manial and finally to him rtsigning in 1926.
The Navy remaincd the ' fìrsc li ne' and gor che largest pare of che rcduc:ed funds
which werc nor enough co build up che flect cvcn tO thc rreacy scandards. Thc civilìan
and military leaders of the Navy sa w Japan as the only possible cnemy nnd srarred
t
ro rclocnte che ban:le-Oeet from d1e Ada n ci c ro che Pacifìc. T he admirals of rhc ba ·
d.eships considcred che rwo new fast aircraft carricrs and thc submarines only as
supporting elements for thc barde-line. The decisive demenc in rhc rcviscd pian
Oratlge, was oow orienred more cowards che recapture of thl: Philippioes than co
holding on ro rhe islands wirh che rcduced Army strcngrh which had co fighe wirh
thc cquipmcnt lcft over from the Great W;u.