Page 346 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
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312                                              jli~GEN ROHWEl

              Having  l~arncd from  intercept~ messagcs  that Hitler wann:d  10 avoid war
           with  the United Scares unril his vietory ov~r Russia.  Rooscvelt acccptcd incidcnrs
           like the rorpedoing of thc denroyer Ktarny and t:hc sinking of t:he destroy~r Rtubm
          Jamu during escort operacioos and used thcm co  persuade Congrcss 10 revoke rhc:
           last pam of t:he  Ncutraliry Aru. While che big rearmamem prograrns picked up
           spc~. che Atlantic fleer was already fìghcing oo che si de of the Allied navies. Things
           couJd  go on  uncil  a  bigger  incidcnc mighc force Hitler to dedare  wur.
              Even  thc dereriorarion of che situacion  in che Pacifìc causc:d by Japanesc ~x­
           pansion into lndochina, and the uncompromismg behavior of t:he j ap2nese in che
           diplomacic nc:gotiations, t:he background ro which was known becausc lheJapane-
           se diplomatic ciphcr 'Purple' had b«n decoped by 'Magie', couJd nor chang~ Ame-
           rican policy. When in 0Ctober and November t:he craffìc analysis of the Japanese
           n a val radio signals dearly showcd that the Japanc:se  were deploylng forccs  for  an
           attack in South East Asia, thc ancntion of Rooscvclt and his military sraff rurncd
           ro  rhis area as rhey waiccd for  the Japanese ro aCt.  But when the Japanese anack
           slllned with rhe raid on Pearl Harbor, ir ca mc as a surprise and was a serious shock
           m  mnny lt-ading circles and 10  the public roo,  and  it might have  led to  a  recurn
           ro  pian Orangt. Howt'ver. sober analysis and a  calculadon of the realistic  options
           led co the dccision  nor to nbandon the arrnngemcncs  of thc ABC-agrecment and
           che  Rainbou1 Fhv pian.
              During thc ncxt  four  ycars of rhe Second  World  War t:he  hcads of govcrn-
           menc, the America n and Briush staffs and the Sovier aUy concinually discussc:d w ha t
           their bt'st srraccgy to win the war Wll5 and t:he  U.S.  Army and Navy Commnnders
           and their sraffs in Washington and in t:he diffcrenc rheatcrs of che war discussed
           sub-straregies,  bur the fìrm  p rinciples of R4inbow Fivt wt're nevcr  forgonen.  Thc:
           analysis of thc discussions on sub·srnucgies is of great intl'rest co t:he histOrian, but
           it must be rhe  t:heme  of a  scparnte  papcr.




                                  BIBUOGRAJ>HY
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               l
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