Page 344 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

310 JURGEN ROHWO
The Army was stili only the second fine of defense. The Navy go1 more sup-
pon from thc navy-minded Presidcnt. Supporred by Representativc Cari Vinson
he aJready uscd his ' 100 Days' emergency Jegislacion in 1933 10 order new ships
for the Navy in order ro resolve the problem of unemploymem in rhe shipyards.
In 1934 thc Vinson-Trammd Ac1 laid the foundacion of a conrinuous building pro-
gram ar a lime when. most sea powers round the wocld aJso srarted ouc on a new
naval a rms race. The dcveJopmeots in Europe made i1 increasingly clear to Roose-
veh that the fundamenraJ premise of J apan as the onJy possible enc:my was no 1on-
ger valid.
1r rook some rime bcfore thc war planning sr:affs of the Army and rhe Navy
changcd 1hcir idea 1har thc mai n offensive joinr wasjapan as according ro the latcst
version of pian Ortmgt. One of the fìrsr ro change his mind was Brigadier Generai
Stanlcy Embick of rh e Generai Scaff, w ho, after a visi c co Germany in 193 7, st:uted
co persuade che orher Army leaders thac the new sicuation demanded a defcnsive
strategy covcring che Western Hemispherc againsc atracks from any direction and
so 11s to win the lime neccssary co build up rhe forces for later offensives.
Such ideas found a posirivc c:cho with Roosevelr, who wanred 10 reach a world-
wide nllinncc of thc dcmocracies co check the aggressors. While intensive and ini-
riaJ.Iy anurhc:rical dlscussions wc re staned in thc joinc Planning Commiacc of che
Army and Navy, Captain Royal E. lngersoll, director of thc: War Plans Division
of che Navy, was se ne sccrcrly co London in 1arc 193 7 co sta n scaff ralks wirh che
Royal Navy for o possible A"g1o-Amcrican wa r againsr Germany and i1s allies, lra-
ly and Japan. Based on the resul1s of this visit and studi es regarding thc dangcrs
for Centr11l America, the discussions in thejoint Pl.anning Commtuee in May 1939
led to the ~mnlgamation of the up to then dominant Orangt and the ocher color
plans imo a new series o( four joint Roinbow-plans, covering the assumed scenarios.
Rainbow Ont ran a long the linc:s ser out by Embick and concentratc:d on Hemi-
spheric defense.
Rainbow TWtt proposed, as the Orange-plans, a concenrracion of offensive capa-
biliries against Japan and purely defensive acdon in the Adaotic.
Rainbow Thrre outlined offensive action in both oceans, but ir was the leasr
realistic pian with the available means.
Rainbow Po11r plcaded for strong offensive action in the At.lantic, and defensi-
ve ac1ion in the Pacific.
While the last three plans envisaged wars in which the \'<'estero democracics
fough1 as Allics, the firs1 pian foresaw only materia! a id tO Brirain and Prance, and
resrricced che use of America n forces to the defense of the \'Qcsrern Hemisphere.
The French Army and the Roy11l Navy were considered as rh e first and second lincs
of defense.
When che \VIlr in Europe sran cd with H idcr's aggrcssion, Presidem Roose-
velr's policy was at fìrsr governed by the expt'ctarion of kt'eping America out of
rhe war. To prcvcnt Hitler from winning his war, he at first rhoughr i1 would be