Page 378 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

344 TUUAKI KAWANO
concern ovcr che warcime confrontation berween che navy and army as well as che
discord berwccn che govcrnmcnc and che military forces. Later, hc motivaced che
developmenc of three imporrane policy directives whic:h werc ticled the " Imperia!
Defencc Policy", che "Forces Required by Impecia! Defense Policy" and che "Im-
peria! Defense Guidelines". In his essay. CoL Tanaka wrore rhar "We will fìnd
our way our of our formcr narional condirions as an island narion aod achicve thc
prosperiry cxpccred of che narion" . He also srated rhac "W e esrablish rhat a fun-
damenral principle of our military operations is co act on rhc offensive".
And, in anocher pare in his essay, he stared, "Wc should assume chac Russia
is our potcntial enemy" !Il. Thus, he was one of che fìrsc co argue thac politics and
milicary srrarcgies should complemcnc each orher in ac:hicving che fundamencalgoal
of cscablishing Japan as land-power (21,
On che other hand, che navy's leading aurhoriry on defensc docrrinc, Capi.
Tersuraro Samh, wrore n book whose ride was "Discussion on rhe H ismry of Im-
peria! Dcfense". Saroh argued rhac Grcat Brirain had becomc a safe and prospcr·
ous natio n because of her abandonment of her terrirories in Normnndy an d Brirany
on thc Buropenn conrinent. Applying Lhìs vicw rojapRn, he wrntc dmt "lr is more
bencfìcinJ far Japnu co ubandon Mnnchurin and Korc.:a from che view polnr of nn·
tionul ddense", rhnt "thc facillties in Japanese possesion in Mnnchuria should be
as peace-orienrcd ns possible", ami rhat "Manchuria should be manngcd mainly
ro eradicate che sources of rheir regional confl!ct". Moreover. he argucd thar rhc
milicary build-up in Russia (which was a primary concerno( rhe army) was only
for che Russia's seJf.defcnse, anJ he criticizcd rhc army far bcing hascy in irs con·
clwion thar the build-up was in prcparation fora reraliacory war againstjapan m.
Consc:quently, there were two divisi ve exnemes in srraregy which were promoted
sc:pnrntely by thc nrmy and navy oo this mosc fundamencal issuc of)npnn's nnrion-
al defensc. On onc: exucme thcre was che army's proposed srratcgy whic:h was
cominenr-oriemed and offensive, and on che ocher there was rhe navy's which was
ocean-onenred and dcfensivc.
As a resulc, che Imperia! Defcnse Policy inidaUy cscablished in 1907 failcd
to forge a compromise whic:h would have unilìcd che divergem views advocaced
by che army and navy. More imporcanrly, it failed co merge the politica! and mili·
rory elemencs inco che unifìed policical antl milicary scracegy chat Col. Tanaka had
srrongly advOC.'ltCd. Another key area of fundamenral d isagrecment berween the army
anù che navy cenc"rcd un rhe issue o( which country Japan shoulù considc:r as iu
primary threur . .In Rdvocating a concinenral srracegy Lhe army narurally selcw:d Russia
as che prìmacy rhccat, while rhe navy's mariti me srraregy logically sclccrcd America
as che most imponanr milirary rhrcar which Lhey had co pian againH in rhcir defcnsc
build-up.
Howevec at this p<>inr ir shouJd be emphasized thar in che opìnion of che
Japanese Navy, America wns nor yer seen as a porenriol encmy. bue rarher as n
yardsrick by whìch co gauge che sìze of the force build-up required <41.