Page 381 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

5EA POWER l'l TIIF PAC!Plr. 347
In July of 1941, taking che opponuniry of rhe oucbreak of war berween Gcr-
many and che Soviec Union. Japan deployed forces co southern Fcench lndochina.
This a et resulted in an embargo o n pecroleum imports co J apan bcing imposed by
che Uniced Scaces.
Prior co chac, during che lasc pare ofjune, 1941, che Naval Generai Scaffha.d
formulated che "lmperial Naval Operarion Pian".
In chis pian, rhe n:wy adopced artide 5A whicb described a scenario for opcn-
ing a war simulrancously againsc thc Uniced Scarcs, Bricain and che Nethtrlands
while conunuing co wage war againsc China. The main concept of the pian was
che so caUed, " Meeting-Encmy·Gradual Anack-Desrruccion" scrarcgy which foUowed
tbc long cscablished navy doctrine of staging a decisive barde by tbe mai n Acce after
che enemy forces had been gradually worn down. In this pian the Naval Generai
Scaff did noc include the " Pearl Harbor Arrock" wich had been recommended by
che Combined Fleet, as ic w;1s considcred too risky an operarion with too many
securiry problcms.
Dcspite rhis rejcction. che Commander-ln-Chief of the Combined Flecc, Ad m.
lsoroku Yamamoro (who opposed rhe war againsr the United Scates to che last).
nevenhelesb conrinued w pian rhe Pearl Harbor operation. Yamnmoco had nor
worked wirh thc Naval Generai Srn(f, thcrefore his own opcracional concept wa~
furmulated wirhnut i t bcing coordinared wirh rhe N aval Generai Sraffs long advo-
caced opcracionnl conccpt.
This split ovcr fundnmenrul smmgy concinued for some rime wirh the Com-
bined Flect, srrongly rccommending che surprise arcack on Hawaii, and che Naval
Gcnt:ral Staff stili advocating the rraditional naval stracegy. This division continucd
unci119th Occober, 1941 , when che Chi cf of the Nn val Generai Sraff lìnally accept-
ed the Pearl Harbor pian proposcd by rhe combined Fleec. This dedsion was rcached
only 50 days prior co che opcning of che war.

Conclusion
lnirially, rhe nnvy insined rhatjapan should aim co csrablish icsclf as a ma n -
n me power modelcd on che example of England. However, rhere wert: many sig-
nifìcanc diffcrences in che backgrounds of Japan a.nd Eogland cspccially regarding
che politica! siruacion in che Asia n cominent. Among tbcsc werc che threat of Rus·
sia, a differenc economie base, che relarivc starus ofJapan in the incernacional com-
muniry and J~pan's own unique hiscocy. l ca n not dcny che fa cc that 1hc Japancse
Army believed rhar afrcr esroblish1ng irself in Manchuria afrer che end of thc Russo·
Japancse war, that che future prosperiry of Japan was dependenr o n becoming a
concinenral powcr. H owcver, as a resulr of irs China policy,Japan was isolared from
inrernational socicry borh politically and cconomically. !t would ha ve bcen exrremely
diffìcult for che Japanese polidcians of rhar era ro resolve the conflict berween che
argumenr in favour of bccoming a contincnral power or rhe onc of becoming a
mariti.me power.