Page 382 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
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348                                             nRUAKI KAWA.NO
              Thcrc was thc "Against·Onc·Nation Milicary Operation"  doccrine which the
           navy rcgarded as absolucely necessary, coupled wich che concepr of achieving a n a val
           build-up equal co  70%  of rhe  U.S.  Navy.
              There wcre the minimum condicions required co achieve a realisdc defensive
           naval Cllpabilicy. Howcver, che progress of rh e inrernadonal siruadon di d nor allow
          Japan cirhcr the dme,  or  che  means.  co  fulfìll  rhese  condiùons.
              Thercforc, Japan, bcing forced co cope wich a  leading world power with ics
           small resources and divided military scracegies, could  not  help bue fail  co  accom·
           plish  its nacional  objectives.
              l e2n noc hdp bue regard rhis was also inevicable, as Navy Captai n Tetsucaroh
           Sa co h ha d forewarned of su eh a failure in the conduding pan of his book entitled
           "Discussion on the  H iscory of lmpedal Defense".  ln  chis  warning he wroce that
           che "Docrrine of both  Flanks", whose ai m was co  make Japan a  Land·power and
           Sea·power at the same cime, would narurally end up in failure,  for  as he stressed
                                                  12
           that ali  narions ha ve  a  limit to  tl1eir  national  power < l.


                                      NOTES

              (l)  G.S.  Tan~k3, ZllikPfrlaiJIII'Oim. Notes by  G .  Tanab.
              (2)  The ddinition o( Seapower from  the OlCford  Dictionary: A nation having an impor·
           cane navy of great influence on che sea. The definidon oflandpower from the Webuer Diction·
           ary: A  natioo having grear  milir:ary suengrh  on land.
              (3)  T. Saroh.Tné.lk.o- K1h bohshitYJn, Discussion on che Hiscory of Imperia! Dcfcnsc,  p. 870,
           p.  874.
              (4)  t6ul., p. 470.
              (5)  S.  Tang1,  Shiw TlltiHiyDh  Swoh.  Privare View oo che  Pac:ifoc  War.  p.  Il.
              (6) S. Ohsho, Datl»nu Ka1gll1lbll Rurgohlan1ai {l) Kai.Jromadt. Naval secrion in rhc lmpcr1al
           Headquancr &  The Combined Flctt (l) Before che oucbreak of war.  Vol. 91.  p.  118.
              (7)  G.D.  Kohbuin,  Gt11mih11jid)()h  Kohjllfllllfl Oboegaki. }..fcmorandum of Drafr Staremenc
           of che Vice Ouef of che Generai Sta !T in  1924.
              (8)  M . Kudoh.  Nil;c11 Katglln 11  TaibuyJJhwmh. Japaoese Navy and  che  Pacific War, Vol.
           l, p.  70.
              (9)  S. T ohgoh,Jitiai ""  Sok11mt11,  Nor<S  Dy Shigcnori T ohgoh,  1952,  p. 98.
             (IO)  G . Daiichika, 7tlltokll Kokuboh~Jin 7ul:dkll  Y1hhrikoh~h leanl:~ilsu:llf'i, The File of l m·
           pcrial  Dd'ense Pohcy  &  Imperia!  Defen5e  Guiddine.
             (I l)  G.  Oaiichika. Sh~u:a jllJtrllntnM Trikaku Kaigun Sakusm ktiktlku Gmtsu111tÌ SiryDh. {Ex·
           planato ry  Materta on che  Imperia!  Navy Op.,.ra<ion  Pian in  che  FY 1938).
             (12)  T .  Sacoh, op. ri1.,  p.  875.
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