Page 379 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

SM POWEll IN THE PACIPIC

The firsr supplementary revision of rhe Imperia l Def«.>ose Policy was ma de in
)une of 1918. Su t, unforrunuely, che conrenrs of chis revised policy are noc clearly
known co us, as che hisroricaJ documencs regarding thc Imperia! Defensc Guide·
lines no Jonger exisr. However, based on the following fragmeorary evidence, we
ca n surmise thac che Qaval saategy began co be shaped concrecely ar that timc. On
Nov. 16th, 1927, Radm. Nobumasa Suersgu, head of che Navy Deparrmenc's Edu-
cacion Bureau,addressed che srudencs of che Nn val \Var College. Ac thar dme ne
oudincd how che recenr naval cxercise had been conducced in the same manner
as ha d been che uadition since 1919 m, i.e., in ebree stages consisting of search-
ing for the enemy. graduai desrruction of che enemy and the fina l decisive arrack.
An estimare of che required force chat Japan would need was given in che study
enrided a "Srudy of NationaJ Defense" which was wrinen by Vadm. Rokuroh
Yashiro. che Presidenc of che N a val War College. H e wrote rhat Japan needed co
develop a naval force equa! w 70% of the strength of America's navy as be be-
lieved mat chis force leve!, coupled with the geographical advamages and me abun-
danc war-!ighting experiences of Japan, would be sufficienc co accomplish che goaJ
of narional defeuse <6>.
In addicion, io Sepcemher of 1924, Rad.m. Hichigoro Sairoh, rhe Vice·Chief
of che N a val GeneraJ Staff, stared char opetacions plannìng in che navy persisred
ro a.dbere co ics uaditional suaregy referred co asme "Agai.nsc·One·Nacion·Military-
Operation".
Thus, chere is adequace evidence rhar me basic concepts of che Imperia! N a val
Scracegy were formed during this period.. m .

Naval Suaregy in tbe Period of Arms Reduction
The arms reduction creary ralks held in Wasbingron during 1921, se t the ra·
rio of me coca! number of large warships and aircraft carriers rhar Great Britain,
che Unìted Stares andJapan .should possess as 5 ro 5 co 3. !t aJso allowed che coun·
rry co recain che exisring milit:ary bases that each nation held at that cime in che
pacifìc Ocean. The Pleniporenciary Ambassador of}apan who accepced mis cond1·
cion was Adm. Tomosaburoh Karoh, che Miniscer of rhe Navy. [o his message ro
che Vice Minisrer of che Navy, he stated mat because Russia and Germany were
io such a poor condition after the war, rhe Uniced Stares had become rhe only na·
cion rhar had che poremial capabiliry of fìghting a war wirhjapan. He fele rhar even
if Japan's milirary power was equa l co thar of tbc Un.ired Stares, Japan stili would
noc be in a posirion co wage a war due m che shortfall of funds thatJapao ~perienced
after the Rosso:Japanese war. He also believed thac excepc for rhe Unired Srares,
no other nadon could acceptJapan's requescfor a foreign loan and mac as a resuJc
Japao should avoid engagiog in war wirh America. Simply scared, he meanc mat
che basic macegy shouJd be to avoid war th.rough diplomaric efforrs whi.le sceadily
pursuing the military build-up required ro project rhe nacion's powerlSJ.