Page 380 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

346 TeRUAKI KAWANO

Afcer che signing of che Arms Reduction Treary in Washington, che second
revis.ion of che lmpetial Defense Policy was carried our. As che navy was consrrained
by che creary co tbe rario of 6 co lO cegarding number of che large ships charJapan
and che Unired Srares could possess respectively, ir was essential ro offser che Unir-
ed Srares Navy's numerica( advanrage. Therefore che naval scraregy ac char time
enphasized rhar Japan should gradually desrroy che ene.my's mai o force as much
as possible by using au.x:iliary vessels such as cruisers, desrroyers, submarines, aod
airplanes before an enemy force could reach the terrirorial warers of Japan. As a
result. a oaval build up concenuating on auxiliary vessels was carcied ou.r.

The Breakdown of che N a val Anns Limiration Treary and che Fall of rhe Scraregy
ln Augusr of 1936, a fìve-minister-confereoce injapan resulred in che so-called
"Bases of NationaJ Policy". Larer, io che Far Easr milirary c.rial held afrer che war,
this basic concepr of nacio.naJ policy was nored as being che fìrsc offìciaJ policy rhac
approved Japan's souchward advance.menr. Regarding chis narional policy, .Prime
Mioisrer Kohki Hiroca stared co foreign minisrer Sigeru Tohgoh after che end of
che war, char che policy was norhing more signifìcanr chan a means of juscìfying
the navy's arms expansion projecr, which had been initiared afrer che cancellation
of rhe Arms Reduccion Treary 19l.
In June of 1936, a chird revi.sion of the Imperlai Defense Policy was drafred
ro manage rhe oon-milirary-rreary situarion. In rhe coordinarion phase, rhere was
serious disagreemenr on che issue of describing che United Stares and Sovier as che
mosr importane porencial enemies of Japan. This disagreemenr cenrered on how
prioriries regarding che poremial ·enemies were co be ser.
ln che Impeciai Defense Policy che pJ:ioriry was che Unircd Srares firsr and
che Soviet Union second, bu.t in che lmperial Defense Guideline, the order was che
Soviet Union was fìrsc and rhe Unired Srares second. However, in che lmperial
Defense Policy a note was addedsrating cbar che giveo order of che Unireci Srnres
and che Sovier Union was not imended to reflecr che relative imporrance of rhese
oacions threars co che nacional defense OOl_ The overridiog purpose of aligning che
"Bases of Narional Policy" an d che "lmperiaJ Defense Policy" was co esrablisb lirm
policies, ro give priorities, and co concentrare che nar.ion's power. Yer, once again
che army and navy failed co accepr a coordinared policy.
Wheo che spending pian forche fiscal year 1938 was being formulated, rhe
army srroogly a rgued thar che navy needed co adjusr ics docrrine co fie che currenr
milirary realiry. As chere was no possibiliry of Japan 's ami-Cruna opecacion being
canceiled, ic was obvious rhar a rwo nacion enemy siruation would exist if Japan
were co e.ngage in milirary operadons againsr any anocher country. As a result, che
navy was forced co abandon irs long sranding one-nation ene.my rnilirary docrrine
and adopr a several-na.rion encmy milit,.ry docrrine.