Page 370 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

1010 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

occupied, sooner or later, by us.” 27
At the same time, Italy signs a pact with England and France which could bring to
further developments, takes away from Germany the possibility of strongholds in the
Mediterranean and strengthens (according to Nationalists) Italian military position (and
therefore, until May 1915, the Dreibund position as well):
“Italy, without deciding for any of the previous targets, takes control of Libya in order to solve this point
of her foreign policy program, and to get international value that can be spent, through free bargain, with
any group of powers that would grant her the best advantages.”
28
According to L’Unità, the Italo-Turkish War, if connected with an alliance with
France and England, would grant the control of Mediterranean Sea to the Entente; on
the other hand, the support the War met on German and Austrian press would be con-
nected with the perception of weakening the Italian interests towards the Adriatic Sea
and the Balkans; finally, in this way Italy solves the problem of her colonial ambitions;
the whole enterprise, according to L’Unità, would be under German direction:

“ [Germany] needs: not only that Italy and Austria agree, not only that Italy is attracted in the orbit of
much bigger expansion policy, where Italian interests could match Germans, but also that Italy has no obli-
gations to France and England.” 29
The magazine supposes that “the Government started the enterprise thinking about a
neutral solution” : Franco-British coldness towards the declaration of war against the
30
Sultan shall be interpreted as “the suspect that the enterprise would beforerun an even-
tual renewal and extension of the Dreibund, and because of the way the endeavour has
been started” .
31
L’Unità asks if a declaration of war against the Sultan is really needed, as France and
England have always successfully well masked their military operations against the Otto-
man Empire. On the contrary Italy, by declaring war against the Sultan, causes severe prob-
lems in the European diplomacy of the time, threatening the (illusory) peace and infringing
the point about territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire decided in 1878 in Berlin.
According to Salvemini, British diplomatic thoughtlessness and French short-sighed
foreign policy lead to a German diplomatic victory:
27 G. Salvemini. 1914. “Come siamo andati in Libia”. L’Unità n°15, 10 Apr.: “Prima o poi la Libia doveva esse-
re occupata da qualcuno, e che in Italia era un dogma quasi universalmente accettato che la occupazione per
opera altrui sarebbe stata un disastro per noi, e che pertanto la Libia doveva essere occupata, o prima o poi,
da noi.”
28 U. Formentini, G. Salvemini. 1914. “L’impresa di Libia e la politica estera dell’Italia”. L’Unità n°12, 20
Mar.: “L’Italia, senza determinarsi a priori per 1’ uno o per 1’ altro degli scopi precedenti, s’impossessa della
Libia per esaurire questo punto del suo programma di politica estera e acquistare un valore internazionale da
spendere, in libera contrattazione, con quel qualsiasi gruppo di potenze che le assicuri maggiori vantaggi.”
29 Idem: “[La Germania] ha dunque bisogno : non solo che 1‘ Italia e l’Austria vadano d’ accordo, non solo
che l’Italia sia attratta nell’orbita di una più vasta politica di espansione, in cui gl’interessi italiani possano
coincidere con l’azione della Germania, ma anche che 1’Italia non sia tenuta ad aver riguardi verso la Francia
e 1’ Inghilterra.”
30 Idem: “il Governo abbia iniziato l’impresa, avendo di mira una soluzione neutrale”.
31 Idem: “[…] sospetto che l’impresa dovesse preludere a un rinnuovamento e ad un’ estensione della Triplice
e nel modo con cui l’impresa fu iniziata.”