Page 371 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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“Finally Germany prevailed. By the half of December 1911 the behavior of German and Austrian
press towards us changed; during the second half of December, Kiderlen Wächter came to Rome (has the
Dreibund been renewed at that time?); right after Kiderlen Wächter’s departure from Rome, our Govern-
ment caused the Manouba and Chartage incidents, which could have been avoided through some good will;
these accidents made French government understand that Italy already chose its way, and caused Poincaré’s
violent reaction. And after that came the occupation of the Aegean Islands – the present that Germany of-
fered and offers us now in order to promote French and British hostility.”
32
As the enterprise, in a way or another, should be done, Salvemini identifies the year
1908 as the most favourable one to go to Tripoli: in fact, at that time on one hand
the Young Turk Revolution takes place, on the other Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The moment seems perfect for a military operation in Libya, but Italian
government is not ready to seize it.
According to the magazine’s director, Italian government shows no strong resolution
towards the Lybian war:
“Already in April 1911 the handbooks of Italian-Arabic conversation started to be provided to the army.
And right in spring 1911 Giuseppe Piazza published on La Tribuna his correspondences about the < Prom-
ised Land >; and right after that, Giuseppe Bevione started his series of marvellous explorations on La
Stampa. And, all summer long, the journalistic campaign increased and intensified.” 33
Salvemini believes that is quite probable that Giolitti planned the enterprise for
spring or autumn 1912 . Then why has it been moved up to autumn 1911? The explana-
34
tion, according to the director, has to be found exactly in the problem which has been
pointed out at the beginning of present contribution: the great illusion, the impossibility
to control public opinion, which is ready not only to accept the Libyan war but also to
lead it to the firing line:
“Would these threats be necessary, if the King and The Hon. Giolitti wouldn’t hesitate? Why then The
th
Hon. Giolitti waited until September 17 to decide?
Because only in this moment he felt that the newspapers served him more then he desired, and that
public opinion got carried away.” 35

32 Idem: “Alla fine la Germania prevalse. Verso la metà del dicembre 1911 l’atteggiamento della stampa te-
desca e austriaca mutò verso di noi ; nella seconda metà del dicembre, Kiderlen Wächter venne a Roma (fu
rinnovata allora in massima la Triplice?); immediatamente dopo la partenza di Kiderlen Wächter da Roma, il
nostro Governo provocò gl’incidenti del Manouba e del Carthage, che con un po’ di buona volontà si poteva-
no evitare ; quest’incidenti fecero capire al Governo Francese, che l’Italia aveva oramai scelta la sua strada,
e determinarono la violenta reazione di Poincaré. E poi venne la occupazione delle isole dell’ Egeo — l’offa
che la Germania ci offriva e ci offre tuttora per lanciarci contro Francia e Inghilterra.”
33 G. Salvemini. 1914. “Come siamo andati in Libia”. L’Unità n°15, 10 Apr.: “Già nell’aprile del 1911 comin-
ciarono ad essere distribuiti agli ufficiali dell’esercito i manualetti di conversazione italo-araba. E proprio nel-
la primavera del 1911, Giuseppe Piazza pubblicava sulla Tribuna le corrispondenze su la <Terra promessa>;
e subito dopo Giuseppe Bevione iniziava la serie delle sue mirabolanti esplorazioni su la Stampa. E, per tutta
1’estate, la campagna giornalistica si estendeva e si intensificava.”
34 Idem.
35 Idem: “Sarebbero state necessarie queste minacce se il Re e 1’ on. Giolitti non avessero continuato a riluttare?
Perché, dunque, 1‘on. Giolitti aspettò il 17 settembre a decidersi?
Perché solo in questo momento sentì che i giornali lo avevano servito più che egli non desiderasse, e che
l’opinione pubblica gli aveva presa la mano.”