Page 68 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

708 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

was formulated very precisely by the then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker when he
said that “We do not have a dog in that fight” by which he meant that Americans had
nothing to gain by interfering. 2
The many TV images of dead, wounded or displaced people, however, caused the
people of the United States and Europe to demand that their respective governments
“did something”. This so-called “CNN effect” was instrumental in the process which
on September 25, 1991, resulted in the UN adopting the first resolution on the war in
Yugoslavia. This resolution, number 713, imposed an arms embargo against what was
by then known as the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

The outbreak of the
civil war in Yugosla-
via was overshadowed
by Iraq’s occupation of
neighboring Kuwait. It
was not until the U.S.
led operation to liber-
ate Kuwait was over in
the spring of 1991 that
the civil war in Yugosla-
via moved to the front of
the world’s newspapers.
When the Yugoslav civil
war broke out, the Danish corvette Olfert Fischer was in the Persian Gulf participat-
ing in the multinational force enforcing the UN embargo against Iraq. Much of the
know-how that the officers and crews of Olfert Fischer had gathered during their time
in the Persian Gulf was employed when the three corvettes later joined the embargo
against Yugoslavia. Here Olfert Fischer returns to Naval Station Holmen on September
15, 1991.

However, Resolution 713 was not supported by military force and did not to stop the
fighting. On May 30, 1992, the UN adopted a new resolution on the war in Yugoslavia
(before the civil war was over, the UN would adopt more than 100 resolutions on the
war). This new resolution, number 757, imposed a total embargo on the FRY (which
by then consisted of the two countries Serbia and Montenegro) and prohibited the im-
port and export of all goods except humanitarian aid. On paper this was a significant
strengthening of the UN’s attempt to force the warring parties to stop fighting and in-
stead seek a solution at the negotiation table. But it had little or no effect as the embargo
still was not being actively enforced and until July 16, 1992, the UN had to be passive
bystanders while the embargo was being broken in at least 53 cases.
The pressure on the UN to do more to stop the war increased and on June 15, 1992,
the world organization took the unprecedented step of asking NATO for assistance. This

2 Maddow 2012, p. 178.