Page 102 - Lanzarotto Malocello from Italy to the Canary Islands
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102                                             from Italy to the Canary Islands



               and this is why we find it hard to label it. From the intransigence of its
               refusal to be subjected to the imperial directives, it shifted to a “tactical”
               phase, so to speak, or rather wisely sea-roving, which was necessary for
               Genoa to stay practical and therefore secure and protect itself in terms of
               business and colonial activity. After that, following the victory of Cor-
               tenuova, which Frederick II saw as the revenge of Legnano, a “Guelph”
               Genoa emerged. We have the feeling that this action was once more “tacti-
               cal” and that independence and a free hand on the seas and in colonial trade
               was still the real objective. On the other hand, we must neither forget that
               – and this really seems to prove our theory – the Genoese Ghibellines were
               only such out of convenience, as vouched for by the case of the Spinolas
               with the large estates of the Scrivia Valley and the Dorias in Sardinia, who
               were afraid to lose what they had obtained thanks to the Emperor.
                  Now, after the defeat to the Island of Giglio in 1240 – a defeat which
               would be considered a real ambush for the way it happened as most of the
               Genoese, from ordinary people to highly eminent figures such as Arnaldo
               de Mari and his son Andreolo, also lined up alongside the imperial army
               and the Pisans – and the death of Pope Gregory IX, with the election in
               1243 of Sinibaldo Fieschi from Genoa, the struggle of the Empire flared
               up again with renewed vigour. It is in this phase that the Genoese felt on
               the same side as the Pope and we can therefore confirm that this “Guelph”
               track would lead to the defeat of Frederick II.
                  The Giglio defeat was a blow in terms of ships lost – more than twenty
               – but Genoese pride was stronger and this would be seen in the way they
               would defend the city from that encircling: the West was in fact on the side
               of the imperial army and at sea the two de Maris guiding the imperial fleet
               and the Pisans were a constant threat.
                  The Parma rebellion of 1247 accelerated the end of Frederick II’s em-
               pire. With his death in 1250, the Italian scenario was quiet and the Pope,
               with his political talent, could now make his way in with the descend-
               ants of the Swedish royal family: Conrad IV in Germany and Manfred in
               Apulia. The latter was the son of the Emperor and the Countess Bianca
               Lancia. With the submission of Manfredi, Pope Innocent IV in fact became
               the sovereign of Southern Italy.
                  Frederick II’s death allowed the various Genoese factions to rest, so
               that the city became moderately calm again, which is the only thing that
               can allow a government to meet the needs of a city with commercial in-
               terests. Thanks also to Louis IX of France’s request to prepare a fleet for
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