Page 72 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

From the deserters who reached the Italian lines just before starting of each relevant operation
planned by the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command, the Italian army obtained a clear and
precise perception of the time and place of the enemy attack a few days in advance. The
same occurred before the Austro-Hungarian punitive expedition of May 1916, before the
devastating gas attack on San Michele in June 1916, before the twelfth offensive of the
Isonzo in October 1917 - that led to the breakthrough of Caporetto - and before the Second
Battle of the Piave river in June 1918.
The interrogation of officers, especially the deserters, uncovered information of utmost
importance, such as the reasons behind operational choices of the Austro-Hungarian High
Command, as for instance, the halting of the offensive in Trentino in May-June 1916 and the
subsequent withdrawal to more defensible positions.
Questioning prisoners and deserters also unveiled many interesting evaluations concerning
the Italian troops and war tactics. The following opinions expressed by enemy officers seem
worth to mention:

The (Austro-Hungarian A/N) officers are all surprised […] by the Italian first line
deployment with many men standing one next to the other. The Austrians at the front
lines deploy no more than one man every 10 meters, and often every 20 meters. This way,
artillery fire causes much less damage. A lieutenant of Yugoslavian origin said: “when I
saw the mass of Italian troops. I was horrified by the thought of the damage any grenade
hitting the Italian trenches could do.” […]
“In the Italian Army”, the lieutenant added, “something is not working. The Italians
troops have numbers, age, and equipment we should envy. [...] They have a perfect
organisation, brave and heroic officers, a great intelligence service supported by many
deserters who say everything because of their love for their own country and of the
hatred for Austria. They have an artillery corps that is now almost perfect, and yet they
do not, however, achieve the advantages that they can and must obtain. […] What does
not work is their tactics, which is too regular in the preparation of artillery, in their
continuous frontal attacks, as well as in their system of always stopping at the first front
line conquered, as their only goal” .
18
It can be easily understood why the Supreme Command promised cash prizes for the capture
of prisoners by individual soldiers or groups of soldiers, while daring coups de main .
19
When operations stagnated, the Headquarters continuously required carrying out surprise
attacks and other small actions for the specific purpose of capturing prisoners. In June 1916,
a circular letter by General Cadorna ordered to “take prisoners, which is essential to obtain
information on enemy intentions and movements [...]. I hereby authorise the Headquarters
of the Armies to increase, to the extent they deem appropriate, the prizes for the capture of
prisoners” .
20

18 Office of Situation, War Bulletins and Missions Abroad, Circular letter, 25 November 1916 about a report of the Headquarters,
nd
2 Army, AUSSME, Series E-2. The letters dealt with the opinions of enemy officers held prisoner on the operational criteria
of the Italian infantry and artillery, starting from the summer of 1915, as per Circular letter no.1654, 17 July 1915 and no.1973,
25 July.
19 Discipline Section of the Operations Division, Circular letter no.6250, 14 May 1916. The following rewards were established:
10 liras for the capture of a soldier, 20 liras for an NCO and 50 liras for an officer.
20 Supreme Headquarters - Secretariat, Letter no.153, 15 June 1916, AUSSME, Series F-2.

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