Page 70 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

Afterwards, the organisation of the information gathering service in Switzerland became
stronger thanks to centres and sub-centres manned by agents generally supported by the
local diplomatic and consular officers, such as “Lieutenant M.T. Moriondi, an engineer and
commercial attaché at the Royal Legation in Bern, directly subordinate to Major General
Alessio Chapperon, the Head of our Intelligence Service in Switzerland, […] who asked and
obtained that a special counterintelligence service be set up in Switzerland” .
12
In June 1915, more than a dozen networks of whistle-blowers or isolated agents were already
operating throughout Switzerland and kept contacts with the detached office in Milan and
its branch in Brescia regularly . A press office in Chiasso dealt with the German-language
13
press review.
In this context, the detached office in Milan acquired a significant role, both as a coordination
centre for military and politico-military information, and as a centre for counterespionage
performed mainly through Switzerland. The reorganisation and expansion of that office
headed by Colonel Achille Brotti were therefore required to face the growing needs .
14
Professor Antonio Cippico, an ‘unredeemed’ person having extensive relations with the
publicists in the British capital, was sent to London to reinforce the local centre. One of
his functions was to publicise the Italian nature of Dalmatia against the pro-Yugoslavian
press campaign. One can easily infer that, since the first months of the war, the I Office
dedicated its efforts to broadcast propaganda abroad and dealt with political matters beyond
the military.
In this framework, given the multi-ethnic composition of the Dual Monarchy - its Achilles’
heel -, the I Office planned of fuelling the latent frictions between the peoples under the
Habsburgs’ rule through propaganda that would foster internal conflicts in the Empire.
However, those proposals were initially hindered by Italian civil authorities .
15

collaboraTIon wITh The allIed InTellIgence servIces
After Italy joined the conflict, liaison officers were exchanged with the staffs of France, Great
Britain, Russia, Serbia, Belgium, and later Japan and the United States of America. The military
missions of the Allied Powers accredited to the Supreme Command referred to the War Situation
Office which guided their activities and provided them with information about the Italian and

towards us, etc.” On 6 September, the Intelligence Office Log reported that “The new intelligence network created by the
office through Mr. Serravallo is generating the first results. At present, the information collected are of political and economic
nature”. (Log of the Intelligence Office, AUSSME, Series B-1,100/S, 1a).
12 Ibidem.
13 Among the more efficient was the ‘Carlo’ network, a nickname for unredeemed Gino Tornari, a resident of Zurich who
received information by several agents residing in Austria-Hungary and Germany. Individual agents operating in enemy
countries relied on points of contact in Switzerland to send information to Italy. These were, among others, Matteo Brunetto,
a native of Friuli who relied on the Consuls in Basel and Zurich from Austria; Ascanio Ceschini, sent to Germany and Austria
on 5 June 1915, who relied on the military attaché and the Consuls in Zurich, Basel, and St. Gallen; Giovanni Permull, an
Austrian naturalised as British who operated in Austria, etc.
14 Intelligence Office, Circular letter no.3756, 24 August 1915, AUSSME, Series F-17.
15 The Boselli Administration created a Ministry for Propaganda Abroad under the authority of Vittorio Scialoja and an agency
for domestic propaganda managed by Ubaldo Comandini. In the Orlando Administration, the Undersecretary for Propaganda
Abroad and Press, Romeo Adriano Gallenga Stuart, replaced Scialoja (Gian Luigi Gatti, Dopo Caporetto. Gli ufficiali P
nella grande guerra: propaganda, assistenza, vigilanza, LEG, Gorizia, 2000, pp. 26-27). For instance, the launching of
leaflets written in the various idioms of the Austro-Hungarian dominions along the enemy lines to induce personnel whose
nationalities were most adverse to the Habsburgs - such as Czechoslovakia - to desert, was soon interrupted at the behest of
the political leadership.

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