Page 96 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

To make things worse over the following days, Italian military authorities were questioned about
this issue by English and French Intelligence Services and reported, once again, information
inconsistent with the real enemy forces deployed. The Intelligence Service had communicated to
the English War Office, via Section R, data not concident with the official view originated by the
Situation Office .
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This led Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino to resentfully request the new Supreme
Commander General Armando Diaz, to provide clarifications, “considering that inconsistent
information was given on several occasions by this Supreme Command regarding the size of
Austro-Hungarian forces deployed along our front and that prejudicial assessments from abroad
should be rectified with accurate and certain data”. Sonnino invites therefore Diaz to inform him
“as thoroughly as possible about the exact number of German units and of old and new Austro-
Hungarian units reported along our front and on enemy rear lines” .
37
General Diaz answered that there were 57 enemy Divisions on the first or rear line, including 9
German Divisions, while another 5 units were reportedly going to arrive.

5.4 THE 1918 REFORMS

The I.T.o. servIce
At the beginning of 1918, according to the Norme generali per il servizio informazioni sul nemico
presso le truppe operanti (General Regulations for the Intelligence Service on the enemy within
Operating Troops), all intelligence activities were divided into two large sectors. The first one,
entrusted to the “Intelligence Service”, dealt with extensive rear lines, both the enemy’s and its
own, working abroad as well as in Italy. The second sector, named Informazioni Truppe Operanti
shortly I.T.O (Operational Units Intelligence Office) and chaired by the Chief of Situation Office
of the Supreme Command, dealt with the contact zone between belligerent armies and operated
on the front line as well as on the closer areas .
38
The bodies of the I.T.O. were the Situation Office and, within each Army, the Intelligence Office that
directly reported to the Chief of the Army Staff. Moreover, within each Army Corps Headquarters,
and when necessary, also within Divisions or at lower level, information collection centres, shortly
CRITO - Centri di raccolta Informazioni Truppe Operanti (Information Gathering Centres on
Operating Troops) were implemented. They generally operated in definite territorial areas and
therefore did not follow the displacements of the units which they temporary served.
The structure of the Intelligence Offices of the armies and of the information collection centres could
vary in terms of number of sections and sub-sections, as well as in terms of personnel, depending on the
specific conditions of each Army. Generally, an Intelligence Office of an Army would comprise: a Chief;
an interpreters’ section; fiduciaries and informers to question prisoners and to translate documents; a

Staff Corps - World War Correspondence, telegram no.508 of 12 November 1917 of the Royal Italian Embassy in London,
AUSSME, Series E-2).
36 Supreme Headquarters – Situation, War Bulletins and Missions Abroad Office, Memorandum of 15 November 1917,
Apprezzamenti inglesi sul nostro Servizio Informazioni (Opinions about our Informetion Service), AUSSME, Series E-2.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegram no. 1816/192, 15 November 1917, AUSSME, Series E-2.
38 The Memorandum of 6 January 1918 of the Situation Office reported: “Enclosed Regulations were written by this Office
to establish the main directive for the enemy-oriented Intelligence Office within operating troops. They do not aim to change
the current functioning of the service but tend only to facilitate continuity of orientation.” AUSSME, Series F-1, env.107.

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