Page 92 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

5.3 Nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (from a document of the Intelligence Office of the 2 Army Corps)
nd
According to Ronge, one of the reasons for the failure of the attack depended on the fortuitous
finding by an Austrian patrol of a telephone wire connecting the Italian troops in Carzano with
the reserves under General Zincone’s command ready to intervene, and because “any attempt to
restore communications was defeated by our (Austrian N/A) fire” .
24

caPoreTTo
The Intelligence Service predicted the Caporetto offensive with accurate information arriving
well before those coming from two Romanian deserting officers, who provided the plans of the
enemy attack in the second half of October. Correct forecasts were helped by telephone and
radiotelegraphic interceptions along with the radio-goniometric location of radio stations, above
all German ones.
As of 7 October 1917, the Intelligence Service reported a “likely offensive on the middle Isonzo
to re-conquer in its entirety or part thereof the Bainsizza plateau; local operations on the rest of the
front; deceptive initiatives in Trentino; limited German support”. On 13 October, according to a
final information appraisal “an offensive action from Tolmin to Monte Santo should be considered
as very probable and imminent” .
25

24 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p. 310.
25 O. Marchetti, op. cit., pp. 192-193. O. Marchetti reported that in early October he had a meeting with General Porro during
which he judged the enemy offensive as imminent, to be expected during the third ten days of the month and located the
Tolimin basin as the starting base for the main direction of the attack.

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