Page 89 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER FIVE

insistently coming also from the Allied intelligence services, in the period between November
1916 and April 1917, greatly alarmed the Supreme Command, which adopted significant defensive
measures that turned out to be completely useless .
12
While the Intelligence Service gave great credit to those rumours, the Situation Office, on the
contrary, remained sceptical and strengthened the Chief of the Army Staff’s appreciation, declaring
that:

Several informers of the Intelligence Service, who are generally considered reliable, have
been collecting and conveying for some time abundant news concerning the arrival of German
troops and materials in Tyrol-Trentino […]. Over these last few months, many rumours have
been reported regarding an imminent large offensive by a Süd Deutsche Armeé (South German
Army) comprising Austrian and German troops, against Italy. Until now, all this information
has not been confirmed neither by consistent declarations of prisoners and deserters nor by the
Intelligence Offices of the armies […]. This consequently leads to be very cautious regarding
the information provided by the Intelligence Service, as they come from scarcely reliable or
untrustworthy informers. In the same way, it is not advisable to give credit to the recent news
regarding the frequent movements that have been remarked, at the end of February, of trains
bound for Innsbruck and for Trentino and carrying German troops .
13

relaTIonshIPs wITh The navy InTellIgence servIce
The relations of the Intelligence Service with the similar organization of the Navy were characterized
by poor cooperation and some tensions, occurred for instance in connection with the famous
‘stroke of Zurich’ which helped neutralize the network of Austrian spies and saboteurs operating
in Italy. That group of agents has accomplished several attacks against Italian objectves, apparently
including the sinking of the battleships Benedetto Brin and Leonardo da Vinci. The Headquarters
of the spy network were located inside the Austrian consulate in Zurich. During Carnival night of
1917, after long and painstaking preparation, some agents of the Italian Navy Intelligence Service
broke into those premises, forced the safe and removed many documents, including the list of
Austrian spies and the plans for future attacks .
14
With reference to this action, Ronge declared: “the most painful loss we could verify depended on
the theft of the code, not to mention espionage documents” .
15
Lieutenant Ugo Cappelletti of the Intelligence Service of the Army took part in the stroke. However,
a copy of the seized material was not transmitted to the Army Intelligence centre in Bern, annoying

12 Supreme Headquarters - War Situation and Operations Office, Memorandum, 14 February1917, Circa possibile grande
offensiva contro l’Italia (On a Possible Large Offensive against Italy), AUSSME, Series F-1. The Situation Office stated:
“Communications from the Intelligence Service continue to mention future vigorous Austro-Hungarian operations against
our front. Such rumours started last November and mentioned imminent offensives in full winter. This Office has always
considered such rumours unreliable”.
13 Supreme Headquarters - Office of Situation, War Bulletins and Missions Abroad, Memorandum no.5, 5 March 1917, Truppe
e materiali germanici nel Tirolo-Trentino, (German Troops and Materials in Tyrol-Trentino National), AUSSME, Series F-1.
Also, in 1918 the reports from abroad proved to be scarcely reliable as, for instance, when in March 1918 a large-scale attack
on the Italian front was expected, which took place two months later. (telegram no. 9359 of 26 March 1918 of the Supreme
Headquarters signed by Diaz, AUSSME, Series E-2).
14 For further details, see: G. Manzari, Il Colpo di Zurigo, in La Comunicazione nella Grande Guerra, Proceedings of
Conference at Ministry of Economic Development, edited by G. Gallerati and C. Colavito, Rome, 2017.
15 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p.293.

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