Page 93 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER FIVE

The actual size of the German forces’ deployment was confirmed only shortly before the action.
From mid-October both the Bern Centre and the Milan Section believed with certainty that German
troops had been arriving in masses. On 19 October, Bern communicated that nearly all informers,
sent in Austria to assess the rumours and news regarding a great enemy offensive, had consistently
reported, when coming back, the imminence of the attack which would be supported by a strong
contingent of German troops.
The Intelligence Offices of the armies were the bodies that promptly and to the best appraised
the enemy’s preparations. As soon as 9 October, the 2 Army informed the Situation Office: “the
nd
vague yet consistent news collected over the last days regarding the enemy’s preparations for a
massive attack on the front of the Army has been confirmed by deserters and prisoners seized
yesterday. The presence of German troops is now certain, and the enemy’s offensive intentions are
validated by many directives which imply movements of troops and artillery in Austrian stations
and rear lines. This news is partly confirmed by the reports of our observers” .
26
The presence of German troops was also confirmed by documents found on the bodies of a fallen
Prussian soldier recovered in the Isonzo and of two Prussian pilots who had been shot down in
the sky over Auzza. On 20 October, it became evident that the large number of deserters coming
from the Tolmin area was due to “the imminence of the attack, with the main clash - according
to their report - on the Tolmin plateau, as seemingly proven by the large number or artilleries and
bombards positioned there” .
27
On the same day, two already mentioned Austrian lieutenants of Romanian nationality serving as
company commanders deserted the IV/37 and delivered official documents showing the details
of the action that the Austro-Hungarian had been preparing. “Those documents clearly confirmed
the sector the enemy had chosen for the attack, the objectives they wanted to achieve, the forces
to be employed, and the approximate date of the start of action, as they were already known to this
Office thanks to the questioning of prisoners and deserters and confirmed by the interpretation of
enemy dispatches that have been intercepted especially by our telephone interception stations in
the Rombon-Tolmin sector” .
28
As the attack was imminent, the Headquarters of the 4 Army Corps warned its own troops:
th
“Based on the clues we have, it is almost certain that an enemy attack, already announced by the
newssheets 2417 and 2420 of 21 October, will take place tomorrow. Enemy fire with asphyxiating
bullets is likely to start at 2 am tonight and continue for about 4 hours. Afterwards, drumming
fire expected to last about one hour and half and then infantry attacks tomorrow morning” . On
29
22 October, the Intelligence Office of the 4 Army disseminated a bulleting opening as follows:
th
“according to information from verified source, if the weather and the circumstances allow it, a
series of small-scale actions would be imminent along the whole front of the Tyrolese-Tridentine
scenario and of the Gail valley. Such activities would have a demonstrative and binding purpose

nd
26 2 Army Headquarters, Telegram no. 4785, 9 October 1917, AUSSME, Series B-1.
nd
27 2 Army Headquarters– Intelligence Office, News sheet no. 2413, 20 October 1917, Stralcio delle informazioni più
importanti delle ultime 24 ore (Excerpt of the most important news of the last 24 hours), AUSSME, Series E-2. On the
contrary, according to Cadorna: “While the situation of enemy forces always accounted for 9 German battalions, there only
vague hints to the possible presence of a larger German contingent. Only the situation bulletin of 21 October mentions
rumours about the presence of 9 Divisions, and it was only on 22 October that such a massive force is detected and counted.
Similarly, the German Alpenkops, which had been assumed to be in Trentino, was suddenly detected and counted on the Giulia
front in the 23 October bulletin only” (Commission of enquiry on the Battle of Caporetto, minutes of General Luigi Cadorna’s
questioning, AUSSME, Series H-4, env.1).
28 2 Army Headquarters – Intelligence Section, Notizie sull’offensiva austro-tedesca dall’Isonzo alla Piave (News on the
nd
Austro-Hungarian Offensive from the Isonzo to the Piave River), AUSSME, Series E-2, env. 28.
th
29 Headquarters of the 4 Army Corps, Telegram no. 4693, AUSSME, Series B-1.

91