Page 90 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

the Officials in charge of the centre who reacted wrongly, as stressed in a letter of the Chief of
Navy Staff, Admiral Paolo Thaon de Revel to Cadorna:

During the recent break-in in the Austro-Hungarian consulate of Zurich, as far as I know, the
conduct of some officers assigned to the Royal Army Intelligence Centre in Bern was not
adequate to the specific requirements of that moment, nor was it consistent with an attitude of
cooperation with the same Navy service. Since the latter came into possession of important
documents taken from the safe which had been broken into, it would have been natural to
convey them safely to Italy through Switzerland as secretly and as quickly as possible. As far
as I know, Major Marchetti Bastianini and Captain Moriondi have, through inappropriate and
patent inquiries, caused curiosity, suspicions and rumours that should have been avoided. By
interrogating unknown persons and speaking loudly, they have considerably embarrassed the
Navy Intelligence Service. On this occasion, too, they reiterated a disrespectful conduct, that
was reported to me some time ago and that affects the perfect harmony of shared work to be
carried out by two similar bodies for the same cause .
16
Relations between intelligence organizations of the Navy and of the Army in Switzerland continued
to be characterized by poor cooperation, although in September 1917, Section R informed General
Porro that: “the misunderstanding has been clarified and relations between the Navy Service and
ours are excellent again” .
17

The reMoval froM offIce of The InTellIgence servIce chIef

The reform of the intelligence service in October 1916 was consistent with Cadorna’s need
to improve the performance of the Situation Office, further staffed with new experienced and
specialized personnel. But it also met the needs of both Garruccio and of the Assistant Chief of
the Army Staff, General Carlo Porro, who had supervised the Intelligence Office since May 1915,
as they showed particular interest in internal political affairs.
The Garruccio’s removal from office in September 1917 was mainly due to his preference to deal
with political affairs, as Cadorna attested in front of the Commission of enquiry on the Battle of
Caporetto:

It is true that Section R of the Intelligence Service included in its report to the Supreme
Command information collected in political, social and journalistic circles also mentioning
rumours regarding the Army Supreme Command. […] However, I never ordered to write those
reports, and above all, I have never attached any importance to them. […] On the contrary,
as I had once read some inappropriate comments in them, I ordered the Assistant to Chief of
the Army Staff to second elsewhere General Garruccio, Chief of the Intelligence Service .
18

16 Office of the Chief of the Navy Staff - 4 Division, Letter no.33, 12 March 1917, AUSSME, E-2. However, there were some
th
further misunderstandings between Cadorna and Thaon de Revel.
17 Intelligence Service - Section R, Memorandum 9428/S, 25 September 1917 of the AUSSME, Series F-17.
18 Commission of enquiry on the Battle of Caporetto, Letter by Cadorna of 14 February 1919, AUSSME, Series H-4, envelope
1. After being assigned to commanding a brigade, General Garruccio was seconded to the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers to create a central political-military Intelligence Office, which soon came into conflict with military Intelligence
Service.

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