Page 85 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER FIVE

Difficulties and recovery until Vittorio Veneto

5.1 THE REORGANIZATION OF OCTOBER 1916

conflIcTs beTween InTellIgence offIce and sITuaTIon offIce

The already mentioned overlapping of some tasks of the Intelligence Office and of the Situation
Office had generated frequent frictions between those two bodies, mainly concerning the
management of information sources.
The War Situation and Operations Office collected information not only from the Intelligence
Office but also from the military attachés and from the liaison missions to the Entente Powers.
On the other hand, the sources of the Intelligence Office included agents operating abroad and
the Intelligence Offices of the Armies Headquarters. However, the latter managed to interact
with the other bodies of the Supreme Command, first and foremost the Situation Office and, at
times, directly with the Chief and the Assistant Chief of the Army Staff, leading to a progressive
detachment from the Intelligence Office of the Supreme Command . As a consequence, serious
1
problems arose along the chain of command, fuelled by antagonisms and misunderstandings, with
the result of impairing the Offices performance .
2
In February 1916, the conflict between the two branches peaked to such an extent , as to compel
3
Cadorna to reiterate that the War Situation Office was the only body in charge of reconstructing
the enemy’s battle order and deployment, writing:

I would like to state clearly, once and for all, that the Intelligence Office, thanks to its different
and often uncertain information means, investigates on all the traces it discovers and collects
information from various sources. Then it conveys that information to the Headquarters
concerned, to allow them to focus on it, and, when necessary, verify it. […] The daily bulletin
on the enemy’s forces and situation that is composed by the War Situation and Operations
Office represents the view of this Command regarding the overall situation .
4
Nevertheless, the issue was not completely settled, as witnessed by General Giovanni Garuccio to
the Commission of enquiry on the Battle of Caporetto:

1 The War Situation and Operation Office asked for support from all Intelligence Office of the Armies to keep the enemy’s
situation constantly updated (Circular letter no. 1901, 13 February 1916, Formazione di guerra dell’esercito austro-ungarico
(Wartime Deployment of the Austro-Hungarian Army), AUSSME, Series F-1.
2 In September 1915, the Intelligence Office asked the Operations Division to have more extensive access to the reports written
by military attachés, which primarily flew into the War Situation Office (Intelligence Office, Relazioni degli addetti militari
- Report of military attaches, AUSSME, Series F-1).
3 Allied military missions had noticed the difference between the enemy situations submitted by the two Offices of the
Supreme Headquarters and had asked for clarification, thus highlighting the issue.
4 Supreme Headquarters – War Situation and Operations Office, Circular letter no.2456, 23 February 1916, AUSSME, Series
F-1, env.107.

83