Page 80 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

The interrogations of prisoners and the information from agents revealed the arrival of German
mountain troops to the Tyrolean front as early as the beginning of July. The I Office noticed that
“this scattering and fragmentation of German and Austrian forces may be the sign of that no regular
large units form the enemy force in Trentino and southern Tyrol, as occurred elsewhere. The enemy
may be trying to hide its weakness and gain time by projecting almost all the troops along the
front and trying to compensate their quantitative inferiority with its great power represented by
the skilful exploitation and fortification of the terrain” .
55
General Cadorna, therefore, could redirect the bulk of his forces to the Isonzo front without fearing
an Austro-German offensive from Trentino or Cadore.
The abundant information, sometimes even exaggerated, about the obstacles and trenches prepared
by the Austro-Hungarians led the Italian infantrymen and cavalrymen to reduce their offensive
momentum in some parts of the front to the detriment of the plans to break through the front .
56
However, Ronge’s thesis that the lack of an overwhelming initial Italian offensive was caused by
the overestimation made by the Intelligence Office of the Austro-Hungarian forces deployed to
defend their borders, does not seem sharable .
57

The “shoves” In The auTuMn of 1915

During the Third and Fourth Battles of the Isonzo - the last two Italian ‘spallate’ (shoves) of 1915
- the Intelligence Office fell into error mainly due to inexperience, since it did not evaluate with
due caution the depositions of some prisoners who had highlighted the scarcity of active soldiers
and reserve deployed against the Italian 2 and 3 Armies.
rd
nd
The content of those interrogations was confirmed by informers who reported on the fatigue and
progressive exhaustion of the Austro-Hungarian troops positioned on Isonzo and Karst fronlines,
following the relentless Italian assaults. Moreover, the statements of an unspecified high-ranking
person living abroad and connected to the official Austro-German circles were considered
particularly reliable, as he said:

The brave and vigorous Italian offensive on the Karst plateau should prevail. It was proven
that the Austrians are scraping the barrel of their units with operational value. They have also
deployed the last piece of artillery available to withstand the Italian pressure. [...] In any case,
thanks to information from both the Austrian circles and our faithful informers, we could
anticipate the fall of the fortified positions between Plava and Tolmin if we maintain a resolute,
offensive effort there .
58
As a result, the Army Headquarters insisted on the attacks, but the expectations raised by the
Intelligence Office and endorsed by Cadorna turned out to be insubstantial, and the enemy positions
were not broken. After this experience, Cadorna no longer trusted the information provided by the
I Office as before, especially the news coming from abroad.
From the beginning of 1916, the observation service was perfected through the acquisition of
several technical devices and the channelling of data to a single body in charge of fusing them,

55 Intelligence Office, Report no. 357, 5 July 1915, AUSSME, Series B-1,100/s, 1a.
56 A confirmation of defensive works extent along the Isonzo came, for example, from the early air recognitions that Captains
Piccio and Moizo, carried out on 8 June in the 3 Army Sector. The flight reports were summarised in Bulletin 61 of the
rd
Intelligence Office.
57 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit. p. 170 -171.
58 Supreme Headquarters -Secretary Office of the Chief of Staff, Letter no.911, 30 October 1915, AUSSME, Series E-2.

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