Page 83 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER FOUR

It is therefore unclear why Ronge could say that “our assault was a surprise for the Italians” provided he
too acknowledges that, despite Cadorna’s disbelief, the “Italian troops were redeployed from Isonzo, and
joined the 1 Army; [...] some brigades with newly formed regiments also arrived in Tyrol” .
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Equally important information about the reasons that led the Austrian commands to stop the offensive
came from the questioning of prisoners, who unveiled several other causes in addition to that exhibited
by Ronge who ascribes the final Austro-Hungarian retreat only “to the new war events on the Russian
front” , that is to the impossibility of deploying additional units on the Italian frontline due to the Russian
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offensive. The interrogations highlighted also: “the very heavy daily losses; the widespread unease
among troops (services were very irregular); the reports of deserters on the very strong reserves in the
Italian rear (an Army of six Corps); the displacement of 50 battalions in several stages by means of
1.500 trucks, from the left wing of our [Austro-Hungarian, A/N] deployment to its farthest right wing”
and finally “the dilemma posed by Germany to abandon this offensive or accept not having its help” .
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seIzIng gorIzIa

Even before the end of operations in Trentino, Cadorna turned his attention once again to the
Isonzo front and ordered the 3 Army to resume the preparation for an offensive effort against the
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entrenched camp of Gorizia and San Michele.
Circumstances seemed favorable to strike this blow since the parallel offensives in Galicia by the
Russians and counteroffensive in Trentino by the Italians had forced the Austrian commands to remove
some divisions from the Isonzo and Carso fronts. In fact, the Intelligence Offices of the Italian Armies
and the Centre in Bern reported significant troop movements occurring from Trentino to the eastern front
and the weakening of the Boroevic’s army along the Isonzo. Before the attack, the Supreme Command’s
Intelligence Office was tasked with spreading rumours to distract the enemy’s attention from Gorizia. A
deception plan was hence implemented by agents of the Bern Centre who disseminated fake news both
across the units and by letters written in invisible ink, imitating the handwriting of known spies.
The railway plans for transporting troops and materials from Trentino were also modified to make
the enemy believe that the destination was Cadore and not Isonzo: “A movement was prepared as if
it should take place towards the area of the 4 Army. All personnel of the Transportation Directorate
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and the commanders were aware of the movement towards the 4 Army; instructions were given
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to limit the movement of passenger trains and goods in the direction of Cadore; preparations in the
unloading stations of the 4 Army area made a mass concentration in this zone more credible” .
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Urged by the Situation Office, Cadorna ordered the commander of the 3 Army, the Duke of Aosta,
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to attack as soon as possible to seize the favourable opportunity and to prevent the enemy from
strengthening its forces along the Isonzo frontline:

I hereby forward to Your Excellency the attached study compiled by the Office of Situation
and War Operations. It shows that the situation of the enemy forces on the front of the 3 Army
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is still favourable. Above all, one can infer - as I have said to Your Excellency before - that any
delay at the beginning of our offensive would reduce the possibility of success, since it would
give the enemy time to bring other troops to the Isonzo; and that, for the same reason, our

66 M.Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p.232 -233.
67 ibidem, op. cit., p. 234. Ronge says he had detected the presence of the Italian 5 Army near Padua.
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68 Supreme Headquarters - Office of Situation, War Bulletins and Missions Abroad, Memorandum of 28 June 1916, AUSSME,
Series F-1.
69 Intelligence Office, Memorandum of 11 July 1916, sent to the Chief, Operations Divisions, AUSSME, Series F-1.

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