Page 81 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER FOUR

with the aim of knowing “with the
best precision, not only the location,
but also the features of the enemy
defences such as their robustness, the
artillery and machine guns positions,
the observation posts, the shelters,
etc. The surveillance was developed
with all the available means, both on
land and in the air […]. The accurate
observation of artillery ‘flashes’ at
night was instrumental in determining
the positions of the enemy artillery
with greater precision” . The
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perfect knowledge of the enemy’s
defensive preparations, therefore,
became indispensable premise for
any offensive operation, from the big
“shoves” to the even small coups de 4.7 Laboratory of photo team of the Army. On the table,
main. panoramic photographs of positions held by the enemy

The ‘sTrafexPedITIon’ (PunITIve raId)

Intelligence Service was more effective during the preparation of the Austro-Hungarian offensive
in Trentino in the spring of 1916.
The first, sparse information on the arrival of enemy reinforcements to South Tyrol and on the
offensive preparations began to emerge at the end of 1915. The I Office considered this information
as reliable already in January 1916, based on news from several agents, from the intelligence
organisations at the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as from the
allied intelligence services. After all, it seemed obvious that, after Serbia’s defeat due to the joint
Austro-Bulgarian-German action at the end of 1915, the Habsburg army could redeploy its forces
on the Russian and Italian fronts.
The amount of information about the enemy preparation achieved by the Divisional Headquarters
increased between February and March: “The several movements of troops and materials reported
in the recent weeks on the Plateaus and in Valsugana continue to date. [...] The frequent presence
of officers engaged in observation tasks, led us to believe that the enemy will soon abandon its
passive attitude to try to land a blow against our front line” .
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Between the end of March and the beginning of April, prisoners and deserters of the units opposing
the 1 Army insisted on the arrival of reinforcements and large artillery pieces in preparation of an
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imminent, massive offensive. As reported by the 5 Army Corps: “the information achieved from
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prisoners can be summarised in a large offensive enemy would carry out in Trentino, along the
Valsugana-Adige front, with intensity on the Plateaus, to open three main lines in Val d’Astico, Val

59 Supreme Headquarters - Secretariat of the Chief of Staff, Circular letter no.1561, 21 February 1916, AUSSME, Series M-7.
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60 Letter no. 74, 22 March 1916, 34 Division sent to the al Headquarters, 5 Corps. As early as March, thanks to the revelations
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of a deserter officer, the positions of large calibre cannons were pinpointed. These were a 380cal. cannon, two 420cal. howitzers,
and many 305 cal. mortars (Headquarters, 1 Army, letter no. 8150, March 31, 1916, AUSSME, Series E-1).
st
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