Page 91 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER FIVE

The circumstances of Garruccio’s removal from office were reported by Garruccio himself to
the Commission of enquiry: “Once the sessions of the parliamentary secret commission were
over, I thought my duty to report my final impressions on the commission conclusions to General
Porro in writing. I believed the most important among them regarded the suggestion that the
Supreme Command, the Government and the Parliament needed to have more consistent views by
establishing more frequent, direct and friendly relationships. It was the reading of that passage of
my personal report in the presence of some officers of H.E. Cadorna’s staff that caused his bitter
disdain. He was certainly ill-disposed towards me and this led to my removal from office” .
19
In the same report to the Commission, Garruccio attributed to Cadorna the request for political
investigations he had conducted and, moreover, criticized the whole organization of the Supreme
Command and of the entire intelligence sector, allegedly too resembling the previous peace
structure.
Colonel Odoardo Marchetti was appointed to replace Colonel Garruccio as Chief of the Intelligence
Service.

5.3 THE 1917 OPERATIONS

The carzano surPrIse aTTack
In September 1917, following the suggestion of the Intelligence Office of the 1 Army that had
st
managed to contact Ljudevit Pivko, a Slovenian lieutenant who intended to desert, a surprise attack
was attempted at Carzano (Valsugana), to break down the enemy lines and reach Trento. The plan
was originated by Cesare Finzi, a Major of the Intelligence Office of the 1 Army, in cooperation
st
with Pivko, during several secret meetings and obtained Cadorna’s approval and encouragement .
20
The initial action “was such a complete success that the operation started at 22.30 on the 17 and
th
the alert in the enemy lines was only given at 3 on the 18 ”. However, the attack failed because
th
among the three units tasked to carry out the action “the only one that managed to cross the (creek,
A/N) Maso and to surprise, seemingly, the garrison in Carzano, found itself alone for the entire
day on the 18 and exposed to the counterattacks of the enemy, suffering considerable losses” .
th
21
The failure of the operation, however, did not cloud the Intelligence Service’s excellent preparatory
work . In particular, Pivko allowed the Italian forces to easily seize the forward Austro-Hungarian
22
lines, fulfilling all his engagements: he sent trusted people to lead the Italian vanguards, interrupted
electricity in the barbed wires, gave the men in his battalion spirits with narcotics that Finzi had
delivered to him, piled up timber to quickly widen the carriageway of a bridge near Carzano for
expediting of the Italian forces advance .
23

19 Commission of enquiry on the Battle of Caportetto, Minute dell’interrogatorio del Generale Garruccio davanti alla
Commissione (Minutes of the General Giovanni Garruccio’s questioning before the Commission), AUSSME, Series H-4,
env.30.
20 Before the action, Cadorna telegraphed the Commander in charge of the operation: “I trust Your Excellency’s energy to
inspire everyone with the utmost drive in carrying out the operation, whose success depends above all on conducting it with
bravery.” (Supreme Headquarters - Secretariat of the Chief of the Army Staff, Telegram no.4441 of 16 September 1917,
AUSSME, Series E-2).
21 Supreme Headquarters - War Situation and Operation Office, letter no.4474, 19 September 1917, AUSSME, Series E-2.
22 General De Robilant, Chief of the 4 Army, was tasked with an enquiry on these facts. He informed the Supreme Headquarters
th
that “Major Finzi and all personnel, officers and enlisted personnel of the Intelligence Service that helped the conduct of the
operation deserve to be praised” (4 Army Headquarters, letter no.10 of 26 September 1917, AUSSME, Series E-2).
th
23 Cesare Pettorelli Lalatta, L’occasione perduta: Carzano 1917, Mursia, Milan, 1967.

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